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Much has been discussed about the Senate and its role in the overall policymaking 
process. In order to understand the body’s overall role, it is essential to understand how 
the internal facets of this complex legislative body. By reviewing floor procedures, 
leadership styles, and committee structure- one will able to understand both the Senate’s 
shortcomings in unable  to produce effective and meaningful legislation as well as the 
Senate’s ability to overcome structural strife. However, these negative aspects of the 
body’s traditions and norms have made the Senate a difficult body for deliberative policy 
action, as such; reform is required for the body to become a fully functioning part of the 
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Chapter One: Introduction- The Senate’s Role in the Policymaking 
Process 
The United States Senate is an integral part of the policymaking process. The 
President, the Senate the House of Representatives, and the Supreme Court all have a 
unique role in the process. A chamber of the legislative branch, the Senate is viewed 
upon as a deliberative body where pieces of legislation are usually slowed to a pace to so 
it can be “improved” upon. This paper will examine the uniqueness of the Senate- which 
is a body ruled by traditions and norms. This paper will examine the role of floor 
procedures, leadership, and committees and how each impacts the process. Also, this 
paper seeks to highlight and propose how to fix the inherent problem of the Senate: the 
tension between the individual nature of the Senate versus its role in the policymaking 
process. 
The “So What” Question  
Scholarship 
An essential question to answer is the notorious “so what” question. Why is this 
topic important in to not just scholarship, but to the general public as well. First, the 
amount of literature written on the Senate pales in comparison to the House. From a 
statistical standpoint, it is easier to assess the behavior of 435 people as compared to 100. 
Also it is generally accepted that Senators have more individual power therefore their 
dynamics within the body and others members may not be as much interest. The latter 
half of that statement is not necessarily true. As this paper will demonstrate, the dynamics 
within the Senate are extremely interesting due to the overall belief that individual 
members have an enormous amount of power and influence, particularly on the 
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policymaking process. The purpose of this paper is to review the Senate’s uniqueness and 
how it impacts, whether negatively or positively, on the policymaking process. This study 
will make a contribution to an area where more congressional scholarship should focus 
on. 
General Public 
The “so what” question for the general public is easily defined. Over the last few 
decades, gridlock has become the norm in the policymaking process. It is important to 
understand and note that the Senate has been a major contributor to this gridlock. The 
public should know why that is the case. This paper will examine the Senate’s role in 
gridlock, and offer a solution to the problem. As mentioned above, the Senate is a place 
where legislation is slowed down and is more of a deliberative body than the House. 
However, slowing legislation and further reviewing it is different from not allowing any 
or little legislation to pass at all. Gridlock has not only been harmful to policymaking, but 
has harmed the public’s perception on the Senate as well. It is imperative that this issue 
of gridlock be resolved, for the institution’s legitimacy but also so that public policies 
that benefit the public will be implemented. 
Literature & Schools of Thought 
Behaviorists 
 There are two schools of thought when studying legislative bodies. One school of 
thought is behaviorism. This school of thought purely studies how actors behave 
individually and amongst each other. This school of thought does not take into account 
the institutions of norms, rules, and traditions. The behavior of the actors is the main 
focus as these actors in essence control the institution. Behaviorists study how actors 
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interact with their consciences, constituents, and colleagues. Understanding how these 
actors behave provides key insight in how the institution is run and if it is effective. 
Historical Institutionalism 
 Historical institutionalism studies both the behavior and the institution. It also 
studies this relationship in a historic context. This school of thought does not state that 
the behavior of individual actors alone can explain an institution; it is more complicated 
than just the actors. It also does not accept the idea that the behaviors control the 
institution. In fact, Historic Institutionalism argues that constrains the behavior of actors. 
Specifically, the institutions rules and norms constrains how actors behave and this it is 
how the actors behave in the institutional framework that can best understand a 
legislative body.  Also, history is important and relevant. Institution’s constrains can 
change over time, and one should study how new rules and norms have impacted the 
policymaking process over a certain historical timeframe. 
 This paper falls into the historical institutionalism school of thought. The 
institution does matter. Senators are behaving in the context that is provided and 
mandated by the institution. These are what we know as norms, rules, and traditions. 
These are constrains put on actors, therefore they do not behave in free-will style, like 
behaviorists would tend to argue. Also, this paper examines these constrains from a 
historic perspective. Rules and norms do change over time, and actors have to adapt to 
new adjustments. The fact that these rules and norms do change is a further constraint on 
the behavior of actors. As this paper will show, senators are constantly constrained by 
these norms and rules; therefore they act in appropriate ways that this context demands. 





 The first chapter of this paper examines the impact floor procedures, namely the 
filibuster, has on the policymaking process. This chapter is historic in nature as it 
provides a historical prospect on the creation of the filibuster and how it’s evolved over 
time. This chapter is divided into several eras of which the filibuster became evolved into 
a detriment to the policymaking process instead of enhancing the deliberation. This 
chapter is a stark reminder that rules and norms of an institution dominate the behavior of 
actors. This dynamic is certainly seen playing a role as the usage of the filibuster has 
continued to evolve. 
 This chapter will also make recommendations in terms of changing the filibuster. 
What is apparent now more than ever is that this tactic is a major reason for the gridlock 
that is currently gripping Washington DC. The chapter will demonstrate how this became 
a problem and why the filibuster is evolved into a procedure that is not what it was 
originally intended to do. The original intent of the filibuster was to protect minority 
rights in a body control by a majority. However, it has now moved the burden of proof of 
passing legislation to the majority, not protecting minority rights. This dynamic change 
has hindered the policymaking process and should be studied in how it evolved and what 
changes should be made. 
Committees 
 The second chapter focuses on the committee structure and whether the current 
system hampers or facilitates policymaking. Committees are an essential part of the 
policymaking process. In committee, a bill is first debated upon and the ability for 
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amendments is supposed to not just improve the content of the bill but may also help 
improve the chances of its passage. Specifically, the focus of the chapter is whether the 
Senate has a committee jurisdictional issue. Known as “turf wars,” this is a constant 
problem found in the House as two or more committees fight over what jurisdiction each 
has on a particular bill. These “turf wars” generally delay a bill and is sometimes to 
blame for a policy never being developed and implemented. 
 The chapter will use two different case studies involving health care reform. 
These two cases give key insight in whether jurisdictional issues are a problem in the 
Senate. The first case study is the 1993 attempt at reform and that the second discusses 
the legislative history of the Affordable Care and Patient Protection Act. The case studies 
will show how committees in the Senate were able to overcome the usual and predictable 
problems that arise from turf wars. The chapter also examines the use of bill referral as 
that is important component of jurisdictional issues. This chapter certainly highlights the 
institutional restraints on senators, but provides an insight that these restraints may 
facilitate deliberation and thus allowing for significant pieces of legislation to move 
forward. 
Leadership 
 The third and last chapter discusses the role of the Majority Leader of the Senate 
in the policymaking process. This chapter will use case studies to understand the Leader’s 
role during this process. Namely, the focus will be on leadership styles and whether styles 
matter. The case studies are also historic in nature as they contain the tenures of Senator 
Mike Mansfield (D-MT), Senator Trent Lott- (R-MS), and Senator Harry Reid (D-NV). 
These three senators have different styles and are from different time periods. The case 
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studies reflect on how these Leaders interacted with their caucuses/conferences as well as 
major legislative issues of their time.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to find out of a Leader’s style is the most important 
factor in determine if piece of legislation is passed. The chapter does not study whether 
the Leader can stop a piece of legislation from passing as this paper is measuring 
outcomes. The chapter will determine whether styles are personal, or if they are forced 
due to external factors that the Leaders have no choice but to impose. This will certainly 
highlight the constraints of individual behavior in an institutional setting. 
“Policymaking Process” 
 It is essential to define what it means by discussing the policymaking process in 
this paper. For the purpose of this paper, the policymaking process is defined as the 
amount of legislation the Senate passes. It merely is a measure of output, not a discussion 
of the finite details of the process. Output is not the only way to define the process as it 
would also include whether the process is deliberative or takes into account external 
factors. In fact, the last chapter does discuss the deliberative process; however, the 
measure of success is a result of output. By defining the policymaking process as the 
amount of legislation a legislative body passes, it easier to understand and prove whether 
institutional norms and traditions hamper or empower the process. 
Conclusion 
This paper will provide a framework to understand how the Senate operates and 
its role in the overall policymaking process. It will fulfill this goal by centering on three 
facets of the institution. The first is floor procedures- every policy initiative is affected by 
how the Senate’s floor rules are used and implemented. The second facet is leadership 
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and styles displayed by the Majority Leader. The Leader is a key figure in developing 
policies and by understanding whether leadership style is the most important factor in a 
bill’s passage will help one understand the Senate as an institution. The third facet is 
committees and jurisdictional issues that may arise. As this paper has an historic 
intuitionalist perspective, knowing the impact of the committee structure has on the 
policymaking process is vital. These chapters are all relatable to one another because it 
highlights the different facets of the relationship between senators and the institution. By 
examining these different areas, it will then be determined if problems exist, and what 
solutions should be suggested. 
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Chapter Two: Floor Procedure of the United States Senate- Does it 
Hamper the Policymaking Process? 
 
Introduction 
 The filibuster is an important component of the legislative process in the United 
States Senate. Unlike the House of Representatives, where rules of debate are established 
before floor proceedings, the Senate allows for an unlimited amount of time for 
discussion on legislation. The filibuster has been as old as the Senate itself, changing 
overtime, but its purpose has remained the same: to be a last check on majoritarian rule. 
In the late 1800s the filibuster was being used more due to the complexity and sheer 
amount of legislation the Senate confronted. There was no formal mechanism to end a 
filibuster, and it became apparent that one needed to be established. In 1917 the Senate 
established a procedure known as cloture, which with a super-majority of senators voting 
in the affirmative, would end a filibuster and allow for a bill to have a final up or down 
vote. This paper will examine cloture’s impact on filibustering. 
 The question this paper seeks to answer is: What has been the effect of cloture 
reforms in the Senate, particularly the 1975 reform that lowered the threshold from two-
thirds present and voting to three-fifths of the entire chamber? In order to answer this 
question, this paper will give an historical analysis of the cloture rule. It will discuss the 
impetus for why cloture was formed in the first place. The paper will also examine how 
effective cloture was in the civil rights era. Finally the analysis will examine modern 




 As mentioned above the cloture rule (Rule XXII) was established in 1917 after 
Senators could not come to an agreement over a militarization bill during World War I. 
Before the 1950s, cloture was rarely ever invoked. This was a time where senators 
respected each other’s “right” to hold the floor and express his opinions. The Senate 
before the civil rights era was still seen as a “good ‘ol boys” club that put mutual respect 
and admiration of colleagues before partisanship. This mutual respect would cease after 
numerous filibusters over civil rights legislation.  
 Southern conservatives throughout the1950s had been successful in blocking civil 
rights legislation proposed by northern liberal members. It was during this time that 
several senators proposed a majoritarian cloture rule that would in effect abolish the 
filibuster. It was a time when the Senate was introspectively looking at its own rules to 
see if their chamber could overcome gridlock. While majoritarian cloture never passed, it 
did begin a debate about the proper usage of the filibuster. Was it really about respecting 
minority rights, or was it being abused to stop majority will? This question is now 
relevant today more than ever, has even the threat of a filibuster grinds a piece of 
legislation to a halt. 
 Reformers never achieved their goal of making cloture easier to invoke until 
1975, when the threshold was reduced to sixty senators. Also, in the early 1970s, the 
Senate adopted a two-track system that allowed for more than one piece of legislation at a 
time. These changes were made in order to strengthen the filibuster. This paper will 
examine to see if that actually is the case. Did these reforms strengthen the cloture rule? 
Or did some have an adverse and unintended impact?  
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 It is also notable that the filibuster highlights a key problem that the institution 
faces. The filibuster exacerbates the overall structure of the Senate, which promotes 
individualism. However, the Senate is a legislative body that is plays a role in the 
policymaking process not only in terms of deliberation but in passing legislation. This 
tension is fundamentally compounding problems that the institution is facing. This 
chapter seeks to prove that the filibuster has only made this tension worse, as it has 
promoted the individual nature of the Senate. 
 The hypothesis to the question above is that cloture reforms would make a 
filibuster difficult to achieve and especially would be effective in ending filibusters 
because a lower threshold of senators that is required to invoke it. This paper will 
examine how we got to our present condition of gridlock and abuse of this minority right. 
The paper will study the amount of times cloture was filed, voted on, and invoked. The 
statistics will shine light on whether reforms have made it easier to invoke this rule, or if 











 The filibuster is a unique component of the United States Senate. Much of the 
literature in regards to cloture and the filibuster is whether the process should be 
reformed. Over the last few years, the filibuster has become a part of the public 
conscience. As gridlock has increased over the last decade, Senators as well as the media 
have pressured for a renewed debate about whether the filibuster should be reformed. The 
debate includes how reform should look like and whether it should be reformed in the 
first place. This review will examine existing literature on the filibuster. This debate can 
be viewed as breaking gridlock, constitutional issues, and upholding Senate traditions. 
This literature review will also fit in the larger research aspect of this paper as it examines 
what previous attempts of filibuster reform produced. 
The Filibuster- Defense of Minorities and Against Unpopular Policies 
 It can be argued that the filibuster can be founded in the basis of what the 
government was built on: a profound trust in government.
1
 The filibuster is a procedure is 
not a unique American legislative tool. Examples would include the appointed Canadian 
Senate and the “ox-step” found in the Japanese upper house.
2
 Although they are not 
procedural tools, these examples show that other countries are taking steps to create a 
dilatory system. These are also examples that delay is a “time-honored political 
exercise.”
3
 Since the House is built upon the “relentless” of the Westminster system, the 
                                                          
1
 Bill Frenzel, "Defending the Dinosaur: The Case for Not Fixing the Filibuster." The Brookings Review 13 
(3): 47. 
2
 Frenzel, “Defending The Dinosaur,” 48. 
3
 Ibid.  
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Senate can be afforded more time to debate and examine legislation, thus making the 
filibuster necessary to achieve this legislative function.
4
   
It is argued that the filibuster does not delay the public will, but that it stops 
unpopular policy.
5
 In that same respect, the filibuster can be viewed as a key part of 
compromising. Bill Frenzel writes, “It [filibuster] gives a minority the opportunity to 
negotiate what it believes is an intolerable proposal into one it can live with. That 
compromise may serve the needs of the majority tolerably well too.”
6
 Yes, the filibuster 
does increase the clout of the minority, but instead of viewing it as an obstruction, this 




Many of these arguments defend the filibuster in that is has deep historic roots 
and is a check against a popularly elected House of Representatives. Several scholars do 
not have such a positive view of the filibuster. Although many of their arguments are 
unpopular does not mean it is invalid. It is important to note that the Frenzel article is a 
defense of the modern filibuster as he conceded that before changing the vote threshold to 
60-votes it was a “killer” (ex: Civil Rights legislation).
8
 This is an important and relevant 
point as this paper will study the impact the threshold change on the success rate of the 
filibuster. The pro-status quo community believes that the Senate is unique from the 
House as delay is good for public policy and that no successful filibuster or an immensely 
popular bill has occurred. 
The Filibuster- Obstruction Against Progress 






 Ibid. 49. 
7
 Ibid. 48-49. 
8
 Ibid. 49. 
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Over the years and especially most recently, much scholarship has been written 
about reforming the filibuster. Starting with the framers, these scholars argue that the 
filibuster was not conceived by the founding fathers. It was contended that the framers 
believed they developed the Senate in a way that a procedural tool as a check against rash 
decisions by the House would not be necessary.
9
 Even though the filibuster was not 
developed by the founders, its origin occurred the Senate eliminated the “previous 
question” because it was seldom used. The House would later revamp the “previous 
question,” the Senate never did, therefore the origin of unlimited debate was founded by 
accident.
10
 Cloture (the formal institutional step to stop a filibuster) was established in 
1917. Before then there was no formal way to end a filibuster and would only ended 
when the minority was exhausted.
11
  
While it is difficult to note how many filibusters have been attempted because one 
cannot assume a cloture vote occurred the use of the procedure has increase since the 
1950s.
12
 The Senate has become more “individualistic” as individual holds have 
increased at the same rate as filibusters and cloture votes.
13
 Individual members felt more 
at ease with using the filibuster, and its adverse impact such as gridlock dysfunction 
became more apparent. Due to this increase of individualism, it is a myth that the 
filibuster is only successful if a program is not widely popular. An example would be 
from 103
rd
 Congress as a law favoring restrictions on lobbyists that had large margins of 
public support and passed both chambers overwhelmingly could not overcome a 
                                                          
9
 Sarah Binder & Thomas Mann, “Slaying the Dinosaur: The Case for Reforming the Senate Filibuster." 
The Brookings Review 13 (3): 42. 
10
 Binder & Mann, “Slaying The Dinosaur,” 43. 
11
 Gregory Koger, Filibustering: A Political History of Obstruction in the House and Senate, (Chicago IL: 
The University Of Chicago Press, 2010), 148. 
12
 Binder & Mann, “Slaying The Dinosaur,” 43. 
13
 Ibid. 44. 
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Republican filibuster over the conference report.
14
 Republican senators in this case 




Reform is necessary because senators have been willing to limit their right to 
filibuster if it fits their interests.
16
 These limitations are known as “expedited procedures.” 
These “statutory debate limits” have included trade packages, certain government 
regulations, arms control, and foreign assistance.
17
 It is important to note that 
implementing these “fast-track” procedures can be filibustered,
18
 but it still shows how 
that the procedure has become more a political weapon than a protector of Senate 
tradition.  
Much of the pro-reform literature follows the same direction and makes very 
similar arguments. The literature contends that the filibuster has become an overused 
political tool instead of promoting deliberation and study. The literature gives a detailed 
account of the political development of the filibuster and demonstrates that this has 
become a negative issue for the Senate. Readers can clearly see how the filibuster has 
dramatically changed the Senate, and that upholding certain “traditions” (even though 
senators may not if it meets their needs) is destroying the legitimacy of the institution. 
What makes this literature unique is that it proposes and examines different reforms. A 
good amount of academic literature tends to focus on the problems without giving any 
solutions. The pro-reformers do not make this mistake and give credibility to their 
position by discussing not one, but multiple reforms. 








 Ibid. 44-45. 
18
 Ibid. 45. 
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Gaps In The Existing Literature 
 Political Scientist Andrea Hatcher writes, “The Senate is understudied compared 
to the House.”
19
 While the Senate as a whole may lack some literature, all sides of the 
filibuster debate are covered. This paper may be able to explain that the filibuster in its 
current form (recent 2013 reforms did not change its overall structure and integrity) may 
continue because the reforms of the 1970s had no impact on how it changed the Senate. 
Therefore, senators saw no reason to make sweeping reforms because by reducing the 
number of votes to invoke cloture, their view is that enough reform was passed.  
 The gaps in the pro-reform literature are less glaring. It provides a political 
development story, examples of legislation when the expedite process was used, and 
provides solutions. This paper may be able to shed more light on what the role of the 
filibuster reform in the 1970s had on how many times it was invoked. The basic question 
to answer is even though it became easier to invoke cloture, why did usage of the 
filibuster continue to rise? The argument that individualism and the use of holds increase 
is a good baseline. The pro-reform literature seems to blame individual senators for the 
current issue of gridlock. It would be interesting to investigate if the body as a whole, 
majority and minority is to be blamed.   
This literature review did examined the basic arguments made by both sides, but 
one should not forget that there is a constitutional (and anti-constitutional for that matter) 
argument as well. These arguments include question regarding why the filibuster was not 
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution vs. the Constitution ensuring each chamber could 
establish its own rules.  
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 As one can see, when it comes to the filibuster there is a strong divide between 
scholars who defend the filibuster as the last resort against majority will to those who 
want to reform and even abolish it. Abolishing the filibuster would ultimately change 
what the Senate is, a deliberative body that was created to slow down the demands from 
the masses. Any reform now would make the Senate just a mirror of the House. Those 
who support reforms also make a strong case, as the filibuster has made the Senate an 
unresponsive gridlocked body that only caters to those individuals who have the 
distinction of calling themselves a senator. The filibuster, while making an individual 
senator stronger, has weakened the institution as it does not protect the minority, it 
enhances it. Moving forward, it is important to examine the impact the reforms of the 
previous century. While it was argued that the reforms (including the creation of cloture) 
were meant to weaken the filibuster, based on the existing literature a compelling 












Evidence and Methods 
The filibuster is a unique procedure of the United States Senate. In order to fully 
understand the impact of the filibuster on Senate legislation, one must take into mind the 
type of analysis that should be conducted. This paper will examine how the different 
rules passed by the Senate impacted it’s usage by the Minority party. Different data sets 
will be used as well as primary sources that will measure the amount of cloture votes that 
were successful or not. This section will describe the different pieces of evidence that 
will be used as well as what methods of analysis were implemented. 
Description of Evidence 
 This paper will examine data that will display the amount of times cloture filings 
were recorded, when a cloture vote occurred, and if the cloture voted was successful. 
This data will inform my content analysis as it will shed light on the narrative of the case 
studies in this paper. There three case studies in this paper. The first one will examine the 
filibuster after a 1917 rule that created cloture. The next case study examines how the 
rule change of a “two-track” filibuster system impacted how members used it. The last 
case study regards the 1975 rule change that established the cloture vote so that three-
fifths and not two-thirds could end debate. The data set in itself will be a primary source; 
however more primary sources such as actual language of the rule change will be used 
throughout the paper. 
Methods of Analysis 
 The case studies mentioned above will be able to answer my hypothesis. This 
paper studies how the impact of different and new rules had on the filibuster. 
Consequently, this is a paper that examines change over time. These three case studies 
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are the major rule changes regarding the filibuster during the 20
th
 century. Therefore, by 
examining how many times clotures were filed, when a cloture vote was taken, and if it 
was eventually successfully invoked, it will answer if these rules changes promoted or 
demoted the usage of the filibuster. Also, these case studies will explain the rise of the 
“invisible” filibuster and how one Senator can halt legislation and does not have to be on 
the floor to actually stop it from receiving a vote. These case studies cases should be able 
to answer that even though it has been easier to invoke cloture because it requires less 
senators to invoke it, why has the use of the filibuster increased over the last few 
decades?  
This paper uses some terms that may be unfamiliar to the average observer of the 
legislative process. A filibuster is essentially a tactic that US senators use so that the 
overall body does not have a chance to vote. The filibuster is part of the deliberation 
process of the Senate; therefore a vote is required to end debate and have a final vote on 
the bill. A vote to end debate is known as a cloture vote. “Invoking” cloture means that 
the Senate has decided to end debate, which would then end a filibuster. Currently, it 
requires 60 senators to invoke cloture. Before 1975, the requirement was two-thirds, 
which in today’s Senate qualifies as 67. Another concept is typically known as the 
“invisible” filibuster which is a Senator holds a bill or nomination but does not physically 
need to be on the floor to delay a vote. Also the “two-track” system, which will be a case 
study of its own, was a procedure used in the early 1970s that allowed for more than one 
bill to be considered at a time. The filibuster, Senate rules, and the cloture are political 
concepts that will be operationalized in this paper. They are essential in determining how 




As stated above this chapter will use a data set that will track the amount of times 
a cloture was filed, a cloture vote was taken, and whether it was actually invoked. This 
information will be available from the Library of Congress. Also, the data set will is 
primary used as the main point of the analysis in three different case studies. These case 
studies deal are an examination of a “change over time.” The first case study is from 
1917-early 1970s, which established cloture and two-thirds rule of invoking it. The 
second, will be from the early 1970s-1975, even though this is a short time frame it is 
important as the two-track system was developed and it was right before the new rule 
change of 1975. The third case study will examine the 1975 rule change that decreased 
the number required to invoke cloture to 60 (three-fifths). The study will impact the 














Results and Analysis: Cloture & The Filibuster Pre-1917, 1917-1949 
Before discussing the creation of Rule XXII in 1917 that introduced the cloture 
vote that established a formal way to end a filibuster, it is important to briefly discuss the 
filibuster before the enactment of the cloture rule. Filibustering has not always been such 
a dynamic part of the overall Senate tradition. Sarah Binder and Steven Smith note that 
during the pre-Civil War Senate “only nine are on record for this period, six of which 
occurred between1845-1860.”
20
 The filibuster became more of an “issue” in terms of 
obstruction for the Senate in the 1880s.
21
 Not only were more filibusters occurring in the 
latter part of the century, they were becoming more successful in obstructing legislation. 
Thirty-one percent of the filibusters between 1837 and 1879 were successful, while fifty-




 So why the shift? Throughout its early history the Senate was noted as having a 
limited workload and had a low visibility. It was regarded as being a “revisory body.”
23
 
After the Civil war this role changed. The workload increased as Senate was in sessions 
longer and Senators themselves introduced more legislation.
24
 Also, one must consider 
the facilities of the US Senate during the 1800s. Before their current chamber opened in 
the 1859, few Senators saw any reason to obstruct to legislation due to terrible conditions 
in terms of internal temperatures and the air.
25
 Even after the Senators moved to their 
current chambers, complaints existed about the air quality. This changed in the 1890s as 
                                                          
20
 Sarah Binder and Steven Smith, Politics Or Principle: Filibustering in the United States Senate 










 Binder, 65-67 
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electricity provided for a better ventilation system.
26
 This may have also contributed to 
the rise in the amount of filibusters. 
 With an increase workload, it was inevitable that more filibusters would occur 
because there was an increase in the amount of legislative activity. Also, with a better 
ventilation system, there was an incentive for Senators to attempt obstruction. The Senate 
was also becoming more highly visible. Senators were becoming more electoral minded 
as the century worn off. Instead of lobbying for the direct support of state legislators, 
Senators would canvass the individual legislators’ constituents. The ratification of the 
seventeenth amendment in 1913 that allowed for the direct election of senators, 
confirmed the trend of electoral minded senators.
27
 With the increase of electoral 
incentives and increase workload, the Senate abandoned its traditional role as an invisible 
chamber of gentlemen agreements (and disagreements) into a chamber that saw the 
benefits of obstruct in terms of partisan and electoral benefits. The Senate needed to 
reform itself in order to balance this wave of partisanship and visibility that accounted for 
more obstruction. 
Rule XXII 
 It was becoming obvious that the Senate had to update its rule to combat the new 
levels of obstruction and filibustering. Rules limiting debate were considered by the 
Senate four times (1841, 1850, 1891, and 1893) before the adoption of Rule XXII.
28
 
These all failed, but in March of 1917, the Senate was finally able to adopt rules that 
would limit debate. President Woodrow Wilson initiated the plan. During World War I, 
many senators opposed any several measures that sought to militarize the country’s 
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merchant fleet. Specifically it was inaction of the Armed Shop bill that forced Wilson to 
ask the Senate to change its rule on debate.
29
 Wilson said, “The Senate has no rules by 
which debate can be limited or brought to an end, no rules by which debating motions of 
any kind can be prevented...The Senate of the U. S. is the only legislative body in the 
world which cannot act when its majority is ready for action...The only remedy is that the 
rules of the Senate shall be altered that it can act...”
30
 The Senate adopted the first cloture 
rule in 1919 which stated that two-thirds of senators present could vote to end debate. 
Use of Cloture 1917-1949 
Now the Senate had a way to formally end filibustering and limit debate. With this formal 
rule, The following graph show that number of times cloture motions were filed, cloture 




                                   Source: U.S. Senate Historical Office 
 
As one can see, during this time period, clotures were a weak procedural tool that did not 
limit the usage of the filibuster. First, clotures were barley ever filed. This had to with the 
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fact that sixty-seven of those senators present were required to invoking cloture. A 
senator (group of senators) would know that if their measure was going to be defeated, it 
served no purpose to even attempt ending a filibuster. Also, the original 1917 rule only 
stated that cloture applied to a “pending measure” (meaning legislation itself) before the 
Senate.
31
 It became apparent that the Senate had to reform the rule in order to make it 
easier to break a filibuster. 
1949 Reform 
 As stated above, Rule XXII could only be applied to the vote on the measure 
itself. Senators could easily obstruct a piece of legislation by filibustering the motion to 
“proceed” on the legislation.
32
 The cloture rule in its original format was just not strong 
enough for defeating filibusters. Rule XXII was expanded in 1949. Christopher Davis and 
Valerie Heitshusen note that “In 1949, the cloture rule was amended to apply to all 
‘matters,’ as well as measures, a change that expanded its reach to nominations, most 
motions to proceed to consider measures, and other motions.”
33
 The only exception was 
motions concerning rule changes. The procedure change also stated that cloture could be 
invoked if two-thirds of the entire Senate (not just those present and voting) voted in 
favor of it.
34
 Senators now had the ability to limit debate at any stage of legislating, not 
just when the bill was under final consideration. This rule change effectively made it so 
that a super-majority vote was necessary to conduct all of the Senate’s business, but it did 
allow for the creation of using cloture in a more tactful way.  
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 The 1949 rule change was a result about when during its consideration a bill could 
have cloture invoked. Civil rights was becoming more of a dominant issue in the post-
World War II years. Gregory Wawro states, “By the late 1940s, it had become clear that 
civil rights legislation had become a particular target for filibusters, and thus cloture 
reform became closely entwined with civil rights reform.”
35
 Indeed, the rule change was 
a compromise between civil rights and supporters and opponents, as the cloture rule’s 
extension to all motions was changed in exchange for having the threshold to consistent 
of every senator.
36
 Civil rights would surely continue to be part of the struggle between 
conservative southern senators using the filibuster, and northern liberals attempting to 
strengthen the cloture rule. 
1949- 1970: Civil Rights: Cloture and Filibuster 
 The 1949 reform was an indication that civil rights legislation was becoming an 
important part of the wider American discourse, and thus so the Senate debate. Even after 
the 1949 reform, Senators continued attempts to make it easier to invoke cloture. Wawro 
writes that “reformers focused on a different strategy for changing the cloture rule, 
seeking to take advantage of the unique context surrounding the opening of a new 
congress and use rulings from the chair to make it possible to change existing rules 
without invoking cloture.”
37
 Many senators believed that they did not have to be bonded 
to rules established by their predecessors. In their view, the current rules were a 
hindrance to passing any civil rights legislation. 
1959 Reform 
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During the 1950s other attempts to reform the cloture rule occurred as well. The 
1959 reform was the only successful attempt Majority Lyndon Johnson put forward. The 
plan “permitted cloture to apply to rules changes and lowered the threshold to two-thirds 
present and voting, while explicitly affirming in the rules the Senate’s status as a 
continuing body.”
38
 The proposal was supported by members of both parties. Two factors 
were behind this rule change, Vice President Nixon and 1958 election. Nixon supported 
the Senate’s ability to have a majority write its own rules at the beginning of each 
Congress. Nixon wrote,  
It is the opinion of the Chair that while the rules of the 
Senate have been continued from one Congress to another, 
the right of the current majority of the Senate at the 
beginning of a new Congress to adopt its own rules, 
stemming as it does from the Constitution itself, cannot be 
restricted or limited by rules adopted by a majority of the 
Senate in a previous Congress. Any provision of Senate 
Rules adopted in a previous Congress which has the 
expressed or practical effect of denying the majority of the 
Senate in a new Congress the right to adopt the rules under 





Although that reform was not adopted, it became clear that influential leaders supported 
the reformers’ attempts to make cloture easier to invoke. With Nixon’s support of some 
type of reform and with the 1958 election electing nine liberal senators who were in 
support of reform, it was inevitable that some change was going to occur. 
 Senator Johnson was able to persuade a number of Republicans and conservative 
Democrats that the reformers had the votes to push their own new cloture rule, thus 
giving them more power and increasing the potential for civil rights legislation.
40
 The 
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1959 reform was a moderate compromise. The ultimate goal of these reformers was a 
majority cloture rule and they were far from complete from demanding their objectives. 
At this time cloture has never been invoked, and reformers were desperate to pass 
meaningful civil rights legislation that had failed throughout the 1950s. The 1958 election 
was a turning point in terms of when liberals saw an opening to defeat southern 
obstructionists that had plagued the chamber over the last decade. 
1964 Civil Rights Bill- Cloture Invoked 
 While the 1964 Civil Rights Act was not the first successful bill to overcome a 
filibuster in decades (a 1962 communications bill holds that distinction of having cloture 
invoked for the first time since 1927),
41
 it was by far the most important. Majority Leader 
Mike Mansfield was successful in bringing the bill for consideration by the chamber and 
it bypassed the Senate Judiciary Committee.
42
 However, this was filibustered, but 
opponents allowed the motion to proceed as attention was turned to the bill itself, and a 
second filibuster was underway. In total, the filibuster lasted for 57 working days, 74 
days total.
43
 The motion to invoke cloture passed 71-29 and after unsuccessful attempts to 
send it back to committee, the final bill was passed 73-27.
44
 Civil rights components were 
successful in overcoming the two-thirds rule by creating the necessary coalition that 
consisted of northern Democrats and Republicans.   
Use of Cloture 1949-1968 
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 It is important to study the impact civil rights and the 1959 reform had on 
filibusters and obstruction. The following graph indicates clotures filed, voted on, and 
invoked during this time period:          
Figure 2  
 
            Source: US Senate Historical Office 
 
What is especially important about this graph as opposed to the previous one is that 
cloture was passed (for the first time since 1927). Also, Senate leaders started understand 
that having cloture votes that would fail could be used as strategic legislative maneuver. 
On popular legislation, senators can call out the objections of a faithful few, and highlight 
that they were on the wrong side of a particular issue. It was the hope that these 
individual senators would see that their filibuster was against the overwhelming will of 
the people, and would vote for cloture and not be as boastful about their opposition. 
These events planted the seeds for what we see today’s legislative tactics concerning the 
filibuster and cloture. The two-thirds supermajority showed just how difficult it was to 
achieve important policy aims. It was indeed the impetus to do something about the sixty-
seven vote obstacle. 
1970s-2013: Two-Track System, the Silent Filibuster, and Changing the Threshold 
Two-Track System and the Creation of the “Silent Filibuster” 
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 Reformers continued to push their agenda and but in 1967 and 1969, failed. The 
Senate leadership in the early 1970s finally believed that something had to be done with 
the filibuster in order to stop obstructionists. The Senate could not afford to be essentially 
halted in regards to one issue. The two-track system was proposed by Senate Majority 
Leader Mike Mansfield and Majority Whip Robert Byrd. Binder and Smith write, 
“Tracking allows the majority leaders-with unanimous consent or the agreement of the 
minority leaders- to have more than one bill pending on the floor as unfinished 
business.”
45
 Before this system was adopted, the Senate could only act on one piece of 
legislation at a time. Therefore, the filibuster was very effective in killing a bill because 
eventually the chamber would decide to move on to other pressing issues.  
 The effect of this system may have inadvertently created more filibustering.
46
 The 
costs of filibustering have decreased because Senators do not have to hold onto the floor 
in this model. This was the creation of what we now in the present day know as 
filibustering, where no speeches are necessary and that in effect are “silent filibusters.” 
Other scholars have stated that the two-track system was a symptom and not a cause of 
the increase in filibusters in the early 1970s. The Senate’s increase workload made the 
costs of having filibusters not worth it.
47
  
It does seem however, that this two-track system is a direct correlation to the 
increase of the filibusters. Senators do not need to hold the floor anymore and after this 
system was adopted only have to inform their intent to filibuster. While the two-track 
system did not alter the traditions of the Senate in regards to unlimited debate, it did 
allow for the Senate to proceed with more than one issue at a time.  
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 Reformers finally had their breakthrough In 1975, after years of debating about 
how the Senate can changes its own rules in regards to invoking cloture. The 1975 cloture 
reform, like its predecessors, was a compromise. Wawro states, “a compromise was 
reached that would require three-fifths of the chamber to invoke cloture, rather than three-
fifths of those present and voting as was originally proposed.”
48
 However, a two-thirds 
vote of the chamber would be necessary to invoke cloture in terms of changing the rules. 
This was the first time the threshold level to invoke cloture was decreased.  
 One would assume that lowering the threshold would decrease filibusters because 
it would be easier to invoke cloture. However, this is not the case. Since the 1970s, the 
use of cloture has generally been more acceptable, because it is easier to attempt to 
invoke due to the lower threshold. Gregory Koger writes that the lower threshold “may 
have increased filibustering, although we might also attribute that increase to the broader 
acceptance of cloture as a normal and preferred response to obstruction.”
49
 The chat 
below indicates impact of the 1975 reform has on clotures:  
Figure 3 
 
     Source: US Senate Historical Office 
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Unlike the previous graph indicating cloture activity, the early 1970s- modern times show 
a significant amount of activity. This is an indication that senators have realized that the 
cloture can be a powerful political weapon in strategic terms. 
 The graph also indicates that the cloture threshold had little to no impact on 
making it easier to invoke cloture. Surprisingly, twenty years after the 1975 reform, 
successful clotures stayed relatively constants. Even though there was an increase in the 
amount of cloture votes and filings. Coalition building should have been easier with 
fewer senators necessary to end filibusters. It can be argued however that coalition 
building was difficult before the 1975 reform to begin with, and seven senators may not 
be a major difference as the Senate was becoming an increasing polarized and partisan 
institution over the last half-century. 
Post-1975 Minor Reforms 
 Since 1975 there have been minor reforms to Rule XXII. These reforms did not 
significantly alter how cloture is invoked. The first minor reform occurred in 1976. 
According to Christopher Davis and Valerie Heitshusen a change was “made in 1976, 
amendments filed by Senators after cloture was invoked were no longer required to be 
read aloud in the chamber if they were available at least 24 hours in advance.”
50
 It 
became apparent that senators would try to attempt to delay a bill by offering several 
motions and amendments after cloture was invoked. So in “In 1979, Senators added an 
overall “consideration cap” to Rule XXII to prevent so-called postcloture filibusters,”
51
 
the cap was set to 100 hours. In 1986 this cap was reduced to 30 hours.
52
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A minor reform was passed in in January 2013. The reforms focused on how the 
motion to proceed is changed and nomination process of Sub-Cabinet and Federal (but 
not Supreme Court) nominations handled. Ezra Klein explains, that the reform does not 
necessarily change the filibuster’s effect on the motion to proceed,     
   
The deal Reid struck with McConnell doesn’t end the 
filibuster against the motion to proceed. Rather, it creates 
two new pathways for moving to a new bill. In one, the 
majority leader can, with the agreement of the minority 
leader and seven senators from each party, sidestep the 
filibuster when moving to a new bill. In the other, the 
majority leader can short-circuit the filibuster against 
moving to a new bill so long as he allows the minority 
party to offer two germane amendments. Note that in all 




The reform also only permits a senator to filibuster a conference report once not three 




These reforms are very minor and do not change the overall structure, function, and 
purpose of the filibuster. In November 2013, a major reform occurred. Senator Reid 
pushed through a rule change that would require only 51 votes to invoke cloture on a 
President’s cabinet and judicial nominations. This was previously known as the “nuclear 
option.”
55
 The 2013 reforms have made the filibuster a public political issue. Once 
argued by intuitionalists and academics, it is now a mainstream political issue. These 
proposals and others will be discussed later in this paper.  
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Indeed, as one can see, cloture rules have had a profound impact on the historical 
development of the Senate over the last century. The Senate has transformed 
considerably into a chamber where partisan victories outweigh policy concerns.  This can 
certainly be attributed to efforts to stop unlimited debate. The chamber was once seen as 
a place where gentlemanly disagreements existed, but respect was still intact.  
The filibuster was seen as an instrument to grant respect to fellow colleagues and 
to allow him /her to have his say. The last few decades of the twentieth century changed 
this gentlemanly respectful approach as the Senate was dealt with more complex 
legislation. Since this gentlemanly respect disappeared, the invention of the cloture was 
necessary for the good of the chamber. The filibuster still existed, and we see a partisan 
chamber that stemming from the harsh civil rights debates of the 1950 and 60s. More 
institutional changes in the 1970s made the costs of filibustering decline. The lowering of 
the threshold to 1975 had no impact on making it easier to invoke cloture, because of 
these costs declining. The two-track system may have made the Senate be able to focus 
on other issue while one particular policy proposal is being filibustered, but it allowed for 

























Recommendation & Conclusion 
 As one can see, the cloture rule has been changed several times of the last 
century. These reforms were motivated by historical circumstances. Cloture was not 
much a controversial issue before the civil rights era. Since it was uncontroversial, 
reforms were not necessary. This all came to head during the 1950s. It should be noted 
that filibuster reform was just one of the many components liberal members sought to 
change in both chambers. Committee structure, particularly the power of the committee 
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chair, was a major target of reform as well. Perhaps if these members would have solely 
focus on strengthening the filibuster, the majoritarian cloture may have had a chance to 
succeed. However, their attempts to change the filibuster gave root to the 1970s reforms 
that impact the Senate today. 
Did the 1970s reforms work? 
 This paper hypothesized that with a lower threshold of senators, it would be easier 
to invoke cloture. Unfortunately this hypothesis is incorrect. Filibusters are still very 
common, and the use of the threat of a cloture does not stop them from occurring. Why? 
This paper has shown that the explosion of the silent filibuster from the two-track system 
has made it easier to filibuster; in fact a filibuster only has to be threatened. The costs are 
lower; senators do not need to spend time on the floor. Also, due to unanimous consent 
rules, secret holds have attributed to the current gridlock as well. With an increase of 
partisanship, reduced costs to filibuster, and secret holds, the cloture rule in its current 
form is weak in terms of its impact on ending gridlock. Something must be changed.  
Alternatives to the Current Rule 
 Before discussing other alternatives to the current cloture rule, it is interesting to 
note the usage of cloture over the last century, especially the last few years:  
Figure 4 
 
Source: US Senate Historical Office 
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Senate Action on Cloture Motions 
Congress Years Motions Filed Votes on Cloture Cloture Invoked 
114 2015-2016 17 18 5 
113 2013-2014 253 218 187 
112 2011-2012 115 73 41 
111 2009-2010 137 91 63 
110 2007-2008 139 112 61 
109 2005-2006 68 54 34 
108 2003-2004 62 49 12 
107 2001-2002 71 61 34 
106 1999-2000 71 58 28 
105 1997-1998 69 53 18 
104 1995-1996 82 50 9 
103 1993-1994 80 46 14 
102 1991-1992 60 48 23 
101 1989-1990 38 24 11 
100 1987-1988 54 43 12 
99 1985-1986 41 23 10 
98 1983-1984 41 19 11 
97 1981-1982 31 27 10 
96 1979-1980 30 21 11 
95 1977-1978 23 13 3 
94 1975-1976 39 27 17 
93 1973-1974 44 31 9 
92 1971-1972 24 20 4 
91 1969-1970 7 6 0 
90 1967-1968 6 6 1 
89 1965-1966 7 7 1 
88 1963-1964 4 3 1 
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Senate Action on Cloture Motions 
Congress Years Motions Filed Votes on Cloture Cloture Invoked 
87 1961-1962 4 4 1 
86 1959-1960 1 1 0 
85 1957-1958 0 0 0 
84 1955-1956 0 0 0 
83 1953-1954 1 1 0 
82 1951-1952 0 0 0 
81 1949-1950 2 2 0 
80 1947-1948 0 0 0 
79 1945-1946 6 4 0 
78 1943-1944 1 1 0 
77 1941-1942 1 1 0 
76 1939-1940 0 0 0 
75 1937-1938 2 2 0 
74 1935-1936 0 0 0 
73 1933-1934 0 0 0 
72 1931-1932 2 1 0 
71 1929-1930 1 0 0 
70 1927-1928 1 0 0 
69 1925-1926 7 7 3 
68 1923-1924 0 0 0 
67 1921-1922 1 1 0 
66 1919-1920 2 2 1 
65 1917-1918 2 0 0 
Total 1647 1228 635 
  Source: U.S Senate Historical Office 
Obviously, the spike in cloture motions filed over the last few years is an indication that 
the filibuster is still wreaking havoc on the chamber. So what can be done? The 2013 
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reform was very minor and does not strengthen the cloture rule. Other alternatives should 
be considered. Table 1 also indicates that the issue of obstruction has only gotten worst. 
Also, table 1 indicates that cloture motions were increasing before the 1975 reform and is 
a reason why the chamber decided to implement changes. The issue of obstruction has 
not improved, but has become much worst. This table is proof that the status quo in the 
Senate is not sustainable. 
 One alternative would be to lower the cloture threshold down to 55 senators. 
Fifty-five senators is an appropriate number to some as it still respects minority rights, 
but in the end allows for the majority to pass legislation easier than today’s threshold of 
sixty. However, as this paper has proven, lowering the threshold does not necessarily 
make it easier to invoke cloture. Although, 55 senators is obviously easier to achieve than 
60, and you may not even need to build a coalition to achieve. The 55 senator rule would 
really make Senate elections important. As of now majority status is nothing more than 
bragging rights. Perhaps a 55 vote threshold would change that perception.  Another 
alternative would be to reduce the amount of votes necessary to invoke cloture as time 
passes on. This approach is seen as more of a moderate version of the 55 vote threshold. 
The threshold number does not really go at the root of the problem, which is the 
silent filibuster. Many argue that true filibuster reform would be ending secret holds and 
silent filibusters, a senator must hold the floor to keep a bill from having a final vote. The 
costs of filibustering would increase significantly, especially in the modern Senate where 
senators are focused on committee work, constituents, and fundraising.  Not only would 
the characteristics of the modern Senate make this reform difficult to achieve, the advent 
of C-SPAN has made senators cautious about their behavior on the Senate floor. Senators 
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would not want to be seen as obstructionists or extreme at home, and would be hesitant to 
filibuster on the floor. While this attitude would reduce filibustering, it does not provide 
the incentive to pass such a reform. The alternative to this rationale is that senators may 
relish the spotlight and would further exacerbate the hyper-partisanship in the Senate 
today. 
Correlation Between Amending Cloture Rules And Reduction of Filibusters 
 Common sense would state that the easier it is for the Senate to end debate by 
invoking cloture would mean that a reduction of filibusters would occur. This has not 
been the case. Indeed, the individual nature of the Senate is to blame for this logical 
occurrence from happening. This is a major tension that the Senate faces: a legislative 
body where individuals reign supreme while they collectively make up a major part of the 
policymaking process. Reforms mentioned in this chapter have not been able to solve this 
tension. The recommendation below may be able to finally fix this inherent problem of 
individual prerogative vs. policy-producing legislative body. 
Recommendations 
 This paper has concluded that attempts to strengthen the cloture rule have failed. 
Whether lowering the threshold or when cloture could be invoked during the legislative 
process, obstruction has won. It is recommended that in the spirit of the civil rights era 
reformers, that the cloture rule should be invoked by majority vote. Budgetary items (a 
reform in the 1970s) have this same rule, it should be applied to all legislation. The 
Senate is not a “special” chamber anymore. Since the enactment of the seventeenth 
amendment, we now directly elect our senators. They are by the same virtue, 
representatives like our local congressmen. They are not different from other elected 
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official that are predisposed to majority will. As such our individual senators are not 
predisposed to this will, so should the Senate chamber and its rule. It will probably be 
impossible for this reform to ever pass, since the Senate changes parties from time to 
time. The majority party knows that it will eventually be a minority, so the prospect of 
not having a way to obstruct does not sound appealing. 
 Whether change comes from the Supreme Court or from within, the filibuster has 
been a grave threat to our democracy. The minority should not be able to dictate policy. It 
should not be the burden of the majority to invoke cloture, but it should be placed on the 
minority to continue a filibuster (an argument Senator Reid has made). The minority has 
several opportunities to offer their input in the legislative process, especially during the 
mark-up period. The only way to ensure that obstruction ends is to invoke cloture by 
majority rule. It is wrong to think that the minority would not be heard if cloture is 
invoked by majority vote. There would still be time allotted for debate and amendments 
could still be filed.  
This is not a recommendation to completely eliminate the filibuster- but to 
significantly reform it and make it easier to invoke cloture by majority vote. The burden 
must be on the minority, and therefore a senator should not have the power to hold a 
piece of legislation on the floor without being present. A senator can still have the power 
to delay legislation, but he/she must be on the floor of the senate in their attempt to 
obstruct a bill. This recommendation essentially uses the examples of the infamous 
Senator Byrd and Senator Thurmond as well as the performance of the actor James 
Stewart in Mr. Smith Goes to Washington.  By being present, this approach to 
filibustering aligned with the traditions of the Senate and the original intent of procedure. 
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The minority is granted its right to be heard yet the majority has its right to pass 
legislation.  
Elections have consequences. If the minority is not happy with its current status, 
than it should change its approach to policies and appeal to more voters. Real policy 
gains come from within the electoral process, not with a small coalition of senators 
compromising on a water-down version of a policy item in order to achieve sixty votes. 
The rationale that the Senate is a body where small-states can defend themselves from the 
threat of big-states is outdated. The current model is now Democrat vs. Republican. In 
the end, the people elect the majority, therefore it should be expected that the majority be 
able to implement the people’s wishes.  It is time for the Senate to update its own 
procedures for the good of the country. It is time to fulfill the basis of the cloture rule: to 




Chapter Three: Committees in the United States Senate- Impeding in 
the Policymaking Process? 
 
Introduction 
 Passing legislation through the United States Congress has never been easy. The 
process in general is not supposed to be simple. Our system was created with certain 
checks and balances that with proper deliberation, solid public policy would be produced. 
Unfortunately, over the last couple of decades we have seen gridlock become the norm. 
Several factors may be at play, including external pressures such as voters and the media, 
but one must look at the institution itself. The committee system of the U.S. Congress is a 
key to unlocking why conflict is occurring. Particularly when an issue that is not so easily 
defined between committee that would have jurisdiction. Committee jurisdiction issues 
also known as “turf war” have been studied in the House; the Senate has not received the 
same amount of scrutiny. Like the previous chapter it seeks to fill a void in the literature. 
 “Turf war” has fascinated generations of congressional scholars. It demands an 
examination of both the institution as well as the behavior of the individuals. It is also an 
important topic in public policy. How jurisdiction is determined can ultimately impact the 
policy implications of a particular bill. The bill could vastly be different from the 
beginning of the committee process (the referral) the end (committee report). In reality, 
jurisdictional conflict could also mean the premature ending of a promising piece of 
legislation. This is usually the case, as often times the hard headedness of a committee 
chair may get in the way of producing quality policy by means of deliberation. The 
question of whether it is worth fighting which more likely means dooming the bill is still 
something members of congress face on a consistent basis.   
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 In an ever increasing polarized congress, the spotlight on jurisdictional conflict 
will be shine brightly. On its surface, it is easy to attack as members of congress being 
whiny and non-deliberative. One can also view the issue as being deliberative in nature, 
allowing more people earlier on the policymaking process to provide input, which in the 
end improves a piece of legislation. Sometimes both cases are true and sometimes both 
are false. It usually depends on the particular issue, the personality of the committee 
chairs, the strong armed will of the leadership, external pressures of the voters, what the 
President may do, how staff members from committees and the Parliamentarian’s office 
work with each other.    
 As stated above, jurisdictional conflict is both an institutional and behavior 
concern. Usually the two are separate problems that would have separate solutions. 
However, the institution allows for more than one committee to take on a particular piece 
of legislation, therefore, the behavior of the actors involved in irrelevant. Having more 
than one committee considering an issue does provide the opportunity for it to become 
more comprehensive, therefore viewed as “better.” However, what has occurred is that it 
promotes just one more roadblock in the ever-more difficult of passing legislation.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to answer whether jurisdiction conflict does in fact 
impede the legislative process. Is the Senate more or less like the House in this regard? 
Also, what roles do the Majority Leader, committee chairman, and individual Senators 
have in jurisdictional conflicts? By reviewing the work on others, this paper will examine 
the use of multiple referrals, individual case studies, and take a behavioral aspect by 
studying the actors. It will also provide recommendations (if any) that could improve this 
aspect policymaking process in the Senate. 
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 The hypothesis to the question raised is that no, overall jurisdiction conflict does 
not impede legislation in the Senate. This is because the Senate is vastly different than the 
House and therefore the committee structure overall is not as powerful. The House is 
more power centered, while the Senate the power is more disbursed. This could be an 
important difference between the two chambers in regards to this issue. Also, the Senate 
is a place where precedence and deference rules the day. Yes, standing rules do exist, but 
they are not formal and have been formed out of precedence. Due to the nuisance 
described above, he actors of the Senate- the Senate Parliamentarian, Majority Leader, 
Committee Chairman, and the individual Senator all do play a role. It will be interesting 





 Previous literature on the committee jurisdiction in the Senate is not numerous. 
Congressional scholars, for the most part, have concentrated their efforts on jurisdiction 
issues in the House. This is predominant throughout congressional scholarship. However, 
while differences do between the two chambers do exist; literature on the House is still 
informative about how jurisdictional difference impact the policymaking process. Yes, 
there is literature about committee jurisdiction in the Senate, but it is lacking compared to 
the House. The issue of committee jurisdiction is relevant in both chambers, and 
therefore lessons can be drawn from both sides. 
 There are two overarching themes when it comes to committee jurisdiction. One 
is that jurisdiction issues create an atmosphere of hostilities; therefore “turf wars”
56
 
between competing committees are created and the policymaking process is adversely 
impacted. The majority of literature takes this point of view. However, there is a counter 
point in which committee jurisdiction is a net-positive for the policymaking process as it 
encourages deliberation and corroboration. This point is not as widely argued, but it does 
provide for a different perspective that committee jurisdictions battles impede the 
policymaking process. Also, the issue of committee jurisdiction is more prevalent in the 
House than the Senate. Regardless, there is a general consensus that the jurisdiction issue 
is an important component of policy development. 
Common Law Jurisdiction& Referral 
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As mentioned above there is a general belief that committee jurisdiction issues 
create a form competition between committees, which impedes the policymaking process. 
However, it is not exactly that clear cut. Committee jurisdiction can be viewed as both, 
“rigid and fluid.”
57
 Rigid forms of jurisdiction are based on statutory law. This form is 
written and generally accepted and both chambers have agreed upon established rules.
58
 
Where tension occurs or, also known as a “turf war” is due to jurisdiction based on 
common law.
59
 This is where jurisdictional claims become more fluid. Common law is 
when the notorious referral process is used, “common law jurisdictions, on the other 
hand, are granted whenever jurisdictionally ambiguous bills are referred to 
committees.”
60
 These types of bills have to be referred to a particular committee, which is 
when the potential for a “turf war” (or cooperation according to some scholars) begins. 
Bill Referral- Multiple Referrals & Confrontation 
 The referral of bills to different committee is an important element of the 
policymaking process. Specifically, a referral to more than one committee is where 
confrontation can occur. This is known as “multiple referrals.”
61
 Since 1995, the Speaker 
has designated one primary committee as the referred committed but can by his/her 
discretion add committees in the process.
62
 The House Parliamentarian has stated that 
essentially these additional committees are just additional initial referrals.
63
 It can be 
argued that having multiple committees give input to complex pieces of legislation 
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throughout the process is positive; it has serious negative consequences as well. With 
more committees added to the process, the opportunity for delay and negotiation can 
occur.
64
 This is also has increased the power of the Speaker as he/she may at times have 
to become involved in the process to and mediate turf war issues.
65
 Indeed, on the surface 
it would appear that multiple committees having input on a piece of legislation enhances 
committees overall, however, if they cannot cooperate they ultimately cede power to the 
Speaker. 
Multiple Referrals & Cooperation 
 Yes jurisdictional issues will continue to be a cause of frustration during the 
policymaking process. However, this does not necessarily mean that multiple referrals are 
always a cause of concern. It is a standard part of the process that those in the House have 
come to accept, “For all the frustrations they bring, House members have come to rely on 
multiple referrals and to accept that much legislating requires coordination and 
bargaining among committees.”
66
 Also there is the belief that multiple referrals provide 
“a cross-fertilization of ideas.”
67
 Indeed, the problem of gridlock may just be overstated.  
The “Transaction Cost Theory of Committees” states that “the less costly it is for 
committees to measure the political and policy assets at stake and to enforce their 
agreement, the more likely they are to avert the turf war.”
68
 The policymaking process is 
never a one size fits all endeavor. Indeed, depending on the piece of legislation, 
committees will balance the transaction costs. In the end, it is may be beneficial for both 
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committees to corporate not for the sake of passing legislation, but that their input is in 
the final version of a bill. 
Committee Jurisdiction In The Senate, Why Is It Different? 
In the House, leadership takes an active role in the determination of multiple 
referrals. However, in the Senate, the leadership rarely takes such a role.
69
 This may be 
due to Senators would not give that type of power to the Majority leader of the Senate as 
House members give to the Speaker.
70
  A major reason that the issue of committee 
jurisdiction is not as much of an issue in the Senate is that the reforms of the late 1970s 
have generally been considered a success.
71
 These reforms realigned committee 
jurisdiction making it more modern to the fit the needs of complex legislation.
72
 In the 
Senate, committees do not play such a vital role in the policymaking process as it does in 
the House.
73
 A stark contrast between the House and Senate is explained below: 
Multiple referral of legislation has always been possible in 
the Senate through unanimous consent. The Senate, 
however, did manage to realign its committee jurisdictions 
during the 1970s, and because senators can more easily 
influence legislation outside the committee setting than 
House members can, they have less incentive to resistant on 
a referral…As a consequence, the referral of legislation to 
more than one committee continues to be much less 




The House reforms of the 1970s were not as effective in dealing with the issue of 
multiple referrals. 
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While multiple are less frequent in the Senate, the issue of confrontation still does 
occur it is just not as evident in the House. This is the case for major measures of 
legislation,  
Yet, a key difference between the House and Senate is that the Senate relies on less 
formal rules. This is clearly demonstrated in the in the Senate committee process. This is 
explained below: 
Major measures are more likely than ordinary bills to be 
sent to more than one committee but even on important and 
controversial bills, formal multiple referral is more less 
frequent in the Senate than in the House. In keeping with 
Senate’s tendency toward less formal procedures, several 
committees sometimes consider different bills on the same 
topic. This can create complications much like those that 




The Senate’s lack of formal rules and the influence an individual Senator has on the 
policymaking process are key indicators that overall committee jurisdiction is not a 
hamper to the process as it is in the House.  
Conclusion 
 Committee jurisdiction is a key component of the policymaking process. The 
issue of turf war, where more than one committee fights over its jurisdictional authority 
over a policy proposal, usually creates gridlock. Bill referrals are a key component of turf 
wars, as the House and the Senate have different methods. The House has a more formal 
process, while the Senate based on tradition, and has a non-formal policy. This is due to 
the fact that in the Senate tradition is usually the way how business is conducted and that 
Senators on an individual basis have more of an impact on the policymaking process. The 
House Speaker and by extension the parliamentarian have more of a role to play in this 





part of the process. In the Senate the Majority Leader and Parliamentarian do not. 
Committee jurisdiction issues may be more pronounced in the House, but it is still part of 




Evidence and Methods 
Researching jurisdictional issues in the Senate is has its complications. However, 
this paper will examine not just the process itself, but also different policies from the past 
that have been impacted by the jurisdictional question. This paper will use primary 
documentation from the Senate, news article that may shed light on the policy process, 
and information passed from the staff of the Congressional Research Services (CRS). 
These will give a clear picture on how jurisdictional issues arise in the Senate, how the 
actors react, and what (if any) solution is produced. 
Description Of Evidence 
 This paper will examine data on three different fronts. First, the formal written 
rules of the Senate will be examined. This includes the Rules of the Senate and Riddick’s 
Senate Procedure, which serves as a source and guideline for procedure in the Senate. 
Second, the data will focus on examples of bills where jurisdictional issues arose. These 
bills will serve as case studies. The second set of data is an examination of the actors 
themselves. This would include Senators as individuals, committee chairmen, and party 
leadership, as well as the Senate Parliamentarian’s office. 
Methods of Analysis 
 The formal rules, case studies, and behavior analysis mentioned above will be 
able to answer my hypothesis. When reading the rules and Riddick’s it will be important 
to fundamentally question whether or not the Senate is an institution that emphasizes 
non-formal rules. The late 1970s reforms will also be taken into account. As previous 
literature reiterates the point that the Senate is where non-formality prevails, it is 
important to formally understand where formal procedure has an impact.  
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  As mentioned above, compared to the House, there are not as many instances 
where committee jurisdiction issues were a problem. This may be true, however, it does 
exist- particularly when it a bill of high significance. These bills will serve as case studies 
and provide a crucial insight into the policymaking process. Some questions to bear in 
mind include what are the types of issues which require make multiple referrals or 
multiple committees to debate the same issue? This could range from Commerce to 
Healthcare, but are there any examples where mundane bills would create such an issue? 
News articles and information from CRS will highlight which bills created jurisdictional 
battles.  
 Finally, one cannot give an analysis on the policymaking process without taking 
into account the behaviors of the actors. This paper will examine how Senators’ have an 
overall impact on jurisdiction. One should focus on role of the individual Senator and 
how the power he/she possesses in a chamber of 100. Does the individual Senator have 
too much power? Committee chairman and the leadership also play a role too. Does the 
party leadership have too little power and the chairman has too much?  The Senate 
parliamentarian’s office also is part of the process as well. This office may be overlooked 
and especially in terms of jurisdiction may have the potential to play a significant role. At 
the very least, it is worthy to include the office in order to understand how it in the 
overall process. News articles, CRS materials, and formal rules will inform how the 
behavior of Senators impacts jurisdictional issues. 
Conclusion 
As stated above this paper will use data from a multitude of sources and includes 
a rationale of different reasons. The evidence includes formal rules and documents from 
52 
 
the Senate, news articles, and CRS information and materials. There will be three 
different methods in how to study jurisdiction in the Senate. First, the role of formal 
rules; Second, particular bills that will serve as case studies; and Third, examining the 
behavior of individual actors involved in the process. With the evidence and analysis 
described above, one should fully understand the jurisdiction in the Senate, why it is 




Results and Analysis: Jurisdiction and the U.S. Senate 
Formal Rules, Procedures, and Precedents 
Senate Rule XXV 
 While the House of Representatives may be more known as the chamber where 
rules and not tradition dictate the terms of procedure, the Senate does have its own rules. 
This document is published by the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. For 
the purpose of committee jurisdiction, Senate Rule XXV lays out the general procedure: 
Senate Rule XXV establishes standing committees, 
determines their membership and fixes their jurisdictions. 
Setting jurisdictional boundaries among committees has 
always proved troublesome. While some jurisdictions apply 
to oversight of specific executive agencies or precisely 
defined functions, others are not so obviously described. As 
a result, a half-dozen or more committees may 
claim jurisdiction in such broad policy areas as the national 
economy or environmental protection. While Senate Rule 
XXV also provides for select, special, and joint 
committees, it does not spell out their responsibilities. 
These are detailed in the Senate resolutions that established 





It is interesting to note that the Senate itself describes the boundaries of jurisdiction as 
troublesome and that such jurisdictional issues occur when there are broad policy areas 
being debated. The Senate also publishes the “Authority and Rules of Senate 
Committees,” which is agreed upon at the beginning a new congress. It is a compilation 
of Rule XXV as it spells out the jurisdictional boundaries of the Senate’s standing 
committees. An example below from the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 
shows that Rule XXV can be thorough: 
1. Coal production, distribution, and utilization. 2.  Energy 
policy. 3. Energy regulation and conservation. 4. Energy 
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related aspects of deepwater ports. 5.  Energy research and 
development. 6. Extraction of minerals from oceans and 
Outer Continental Shelf lands. 7. Hydroelectric power, 
irrigation, and reclamation. 8. Mining education and 
research. 9. Mining, mineral lands, mining claims, and 
mineral conservation. 10. National parks, recreation areas, 
wilderness areas, wild and scenic rivers, historical sits, 
military parks and battlefields, and on the public domain, 
preservation of prehistoric ruins and objects of 
interest.11. Naval petroleum reserves in Alaska. 
12.  Nonmilitary development of nuclear energy. 13. Oil 
and gas production and distribution 14. Public lands and 
forests, including faming and grazing thereon, and mineral 
extraction thereon. 15. Solar energy systems. 16. Territorial 
possessions of the United States, including trusteeships. 
17. Such committee shall also study and review, on a 
comprehensive basis, matters relating to energy and 





The example above indicates that the rules are pretty straight forward when it comes to 
jurisdiction. It is both broad and specific.   
Referrals- Senate Rule XVII 
 Like the House, when a member introduces a bill, it is referred to a committee. 
The chair has discretion of which bill the committee will consider.
78
 It is important to 
note that the focus of this section is on multiple referral of bills, not jurisdiction issues 
overall. While it is rare, multiple referrals still do occur in the Senate. According to CRS,  
Senate Rule XVII allows a measure to be referred to 
multiple committees for consideration. Two types of 
multiple referrals are allowed. A joint referral allows a 
measure to be referred to two or more committees for 
simultaneous consideration, while a sequential referral 
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It is important to note that as described, Senate Rule XVII sets forth two different types 
of multiple referrals. Simultaneous consideration or sequential are different and both 
would have a different impact on the process. On one hand, a simultaneous consideration 
may at the surface produce gridlock as a turf war would commence. On the hand, a 
sequential referral may enhance the policymaking process by allowing a bill to be 
“improved” upon.  
It is important to note that multiple referrals are rare. In fact during the 108
th
 
Congress, only .42% of measures were multiply referred.
80
 In the House, the rate was 
much higher at 20.65%.
81
 Since the 101
st
 Congress the percentage of multiple referred 




 Just the rarity of 
multiple referral is an indication that it may not be a “major issue” in terms of 
jurisdictional battles in regards to the policymaking process. However, it still does occur 
and it still makes an impact on important pieces of legislation. In the end, multiple 
referrals are issued by actors in the policymaking process, which will be further discussed 
below. 
Riddick’s Senate Procedure: Precedents and Practices 
An essential tool that he Senate uses for procedure is a document known as 
Riddick’s Senate Procedure: Precedents and Practices. Riddick’s was “named after 
Senate Parliamentarian Emeritus Floyd M. Riddick, this Senate document contains the 
contemporary precedents and practices of the Senate… It is updated periodically by the 
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 Roll describes Riddick’s in that “more than 10,000 precedents 
are spelled out in Riddick’s Senate Procedure, the bible of the chamber’s 
parliamentarians.”
84
  Former Sen. Thomas Eagleton said of Riddick’s, “the nearest thing 
to the Bible that the Senate has.”
85
 That is certainly not an understatement.  
  Riddick’s expands on the formal jurisdictional claims established by Rule XXV. 
“r. The following bills were referred to the above 
committee… the question of reference having been raised:  
i. A Bill to extend the provisions of the Federal Airport Act 
to the Virginia Islands; ii. A bill to confirm and establish 
the titles of the States to lands and waters and to provide for 




For jurisdictional purposes, Riddick’s confirms what scholars have written about the 
Senate, that precedent, and not formal rules dictate the procedure of the Senate. However, 
Elizabeth Rybicki of Congressional Research Services describes Riddick’s as not having 
“a ton of information” in regards to referrals.
87
 So while this “bible” of the Senate is very 
useful in knowing and classifying precedent in the Senate, it only partially solves the 
inherent issue of committee turf wars. This problem of multiple referrals may not be rare, 
but Riddick’s does not have the final answer that it may have for other procedures of the 
Senate, such as on the floor. Therefore the behavior of individual actors during the 
policymaking process must be examined.   
Healthcare Legislation and Jurisdiction 
 Before one examines the role of individuals, some case studies may shed more 
light on jurisdictional issues. As noted above, in the Senate, jurisdictional issues usually 
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occur when there is a major policy initiative that is broad. One issue where this has 
occurred in the past is healthcare. In both the Health Security Act and the Affordable Care 
and Patient Protection Act, two committees, the Senate Finance committee and the 
Senate Health, Education, and Labor (HELP) were tasked with “producing that 
chamber’s version of health care legislation.”
88
 In 1993, it was Finance and Human 
Resources Committee which, instead of working on two different versions with the end 
goal of “working it out” and merging into one bill, could not come to an agreement. 
Indeed, healthcare still remains a contentious issue that will continue to challenge the 
rarity of committee jurisdiction battles in the Senate. 
Affordable Care and Patient Protect Act  
 It should be noted technically the Affordable Care Act was never formally 
referred in the Senate. In breaking with typical legislative process protocol, the 
committees themselves introduced the legislation through the markup process.
89
 This has 
been characterized as being a “technicality.”
90
 Therefore, it is still a useful case study in 
how the Senate handles jurisdiction and ultimately merging two different pieces of 
legislation and merging it into one. 
Obviously healthcare is one of those issues that would have a broad appeal. Not 
only is it broad, it is a controversial issue as well. Therefore, simultaneously working on 
two different bills made since because the issue is very comprehensive. The Finance 
committee dealt with the legislation because under jurisdiction rules and precedent the 
committee dealt with “health programs under the Social security Act and health programs 
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finance by a specific tax or trust fund.”
91
 Of course, “Finance” is not the first word that 
comes to mind when mentioning healthcare. The healthcare proposal needed some sort of 
funding source, therefore the Finance committee had jurisdiction. The Finance healthcare 
version is remembered as the “gang of six” whom attempted to produce a bill. This gang 
of six included Democratic senators, Max Baucus, Jeff Bingaman, and Kent Conrad, as 
well as three Republic Senators, Mike Enzi, Chuck Grassley, and Olympia Snow. They 
met for months in 2009 but were unable to come to an agreement.
92
 The Finance version 
took the longest, was more in the spotlight and was the more contentious of the two bills 
that were being deliberated in committee. 
 The HELP committee would be the more obvious choice to take up a healthcare 
bill. According to Senate rules and precedent the HELP committee has jurisdiction in 
matters concerning “education, labor, health, and public welfare.”
93
 This committee is 
generally thought of as being more liberal and up to the task of passing a comprehensive 
piece of legislation. After aggressive Markup sessions it was held for a couple of months 
and reported to the floor with a committee report.
94
 Again, the legislation did not have the 
same public scrutiny as the Finance bill. 
Due to the two different committees having vastly different intentions and 
membership, two pieces of legislation were produced. Since this was a historic measure, 
blending the two bills was extremely important. Majority Leader Harry Reid then became 
the lead Senator on the bill as “led the effort by prominent Democratic senators and the 
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White House to merge the HELP and Finance Committee bills into one.”
95
 The 
legislative history becomes more complicated after the Senate bill was blended into one 
as House bills were merged and the budget reconciliation process had to be implemented 
for final passage. 
The Affordable Care Act is proof that when it comes to a contentious and broad 
issue, the Senate does use multiple referrals. However, it did so in terms of jurisdictional 
overlap, not necessarily “turf wars” that may be associated with such high profile pieces 
of legislation. The Senators deferred to the standing rules and Riddick’s there was no 
need for the Parliamentarian or the Majority Leader to act as a referee. This is a case 
where it made sense for two different committees to work on separate pieces of 
legislation. The end goal would be a merged bill, and with by working on the legislation 
simultaneously, it was easier for the bill to be rectified behind closed doors. If the two 
bills were worked in sequentially, the likelihood of roadblocks would have occurred. 
Also, the two committees would have seen themselves competition with themselves and 
forgetting that eventually they would have to make concessions in order to pass one 
merged bill. 
Health Security Act of 1993 
The healthcare debate of 1993 did not have the same positive result. Instead of 
enhancing jurisdictional issues actually halted the process. The Health Security Act was a 
contentious bill. The two committees could have come to an agreement:  
On the Senate side a similar power struggle broke out 
between the Finance and [Labor and] Human Resources 
Committee [which the HELP committee was known as the 
time]. The committees eventually reviewed bills with the 
segments having to do with overlapping jurisdiction 
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deleted. This diverse and controversial legislation would 
have required consensus to move along, and such 
consensus could never be developed. It is evident that the 





Unlike the Affordable Care Act these Senators in the 1990s did not see their role as 
“staying in their lane” and “working it out later.” Ultimately, these actions played a role 
in dooming the Health Security Act. 
Despite how the legislative history of the Affordable Care Act will be 
remembered one must keep in mind in terms of the committee history in the Senate, the 
process was rather smooth. It did take time, and yes the “gang of six” did fail, but in the 
end two different bills were reported to the floor. The Senate learned its lesson from the 
healthcare debate of the 1990s, instead of debating jurisdictional boundaries during the 
committee process, it is better to have different committees work on separate pieces of 
legislation and then “work it out” later. In fact, what made the Affordable Care Act 
successful is that it was generally agreed upon before the bills were taken in committee 
that this was the proper route. Also, there is a difference. As mentioned above, this 
phenomenon of multiple referrals in the Senate only happens on average around 1%, but 
when this rarity occurs, the Senate becomes a spectacle that commands attention from the 
media and public at large. 
Jurisdiction and Senate Actors 
 This chapter has focused on the role of rules and precedent in regards to Senate 
committee jurisdiction. Rules and precedent is important (especially in the case of the 
Senate- as precedent is the determining factor), but one cannot ignore the role that people 
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have in the process. This would include the Senate Parliamentarian, the committee chairs, 
leadership, and individual senators. The office of Senate Parliamentarian is particularly 
interesting, as this office may be over shadowed by the personalities of who these driven 
Senators. 
Parliamentarian 
 For the most part, the Senate Parliamentarian is a non-controversial position. 
Many characterize the office as being merely administrative and advisory. In terms of 
referral, they usually just defer to the rules and Riddick’s. Rybicki stated the following 
about the Senate Parliamentarian:  
I imagine prior referral decisions would be the 
Parliamentarian's major resource.  I do not know anything 
about the nature of the files or notes in the Office of the 
Parliamentarian, but certainly they research where bills on 
the same subject were referred before, and these prior 
referrals establish precedent for subsequent referrals. Staff 
of interested committees will sometimes discuss referral 
issues with the Parliamentarian, who, after all, is not an 
expert on the particular policy in question. If it is an area 
with jurisdictional overlap or perhaps a history of 
disagreements between committees, the Parliamentarian 
might even seek arguments from the committee staff of all 
the interested committees. But discussions with staff over 




However, when it comes to controversial measures such as healthcare legislation their 
role becomes more known and defined. This was particularly true during the 2009-2010 
Affordable Care Act debate. 
 Near the end of the debate on the Affordable Care Act, the Senate Parliamentarian 
played a key role. This was an extreme instance where the Senate Parliamentarian 
becomes a referee. This occurrence is described below: 
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While reconciliation was politically expedient for health 
care reform advocates, it presented some procedural pitfalls 
that had to be navigated to achieve an up or down vote. The 
referee over how to proceed in the Senate was that 
chamber’s parliamentarian, a normally obscure post which 
had temporarily risen in prominence thanks to the health 
care debate. On March 11, the Senate Parliamentarian had 
ruled that the House had to pass House bill 3590, and it had 
to be signed by the President into law, before the Senate 
could even take up the reconciliation bill. After the 
President signed House bill 3590 on March 23, the 





Usually Senate precedent and rules would be enough for understanding how to move 
forward. However, the Affordable Care Act presented a unique challenge in that in order 
for it to pass it, had to be as a reconciliation bill (these types of bills are budget related 
and only require 50 votes, instead of the usual 60 votes to invoke cloture and end debate). 
The Parliamentarian took the unusual step in becoming a referee and ensuring that a bill 
would survive. This issue has not gone away since the passage of the Affordable Care 
Act. Republicans in 2012 were considering ways to extract parts of the Act through the 
budget reconciliation process. Politico stated that the Senate Parliamentarian would be 
“at the center of the decision.”
99
 The Parliamentarian’s role in the implementation of the 
Affordable Care Act is still not over.  
Healthcare legislation is not the only example where the Parliamentarian has 
stepped into the spotlight. This would include the budget. The Parliamentarian has in the 
past even overruled the Majority leader: 
The Senate is required by law to pass an annual budget but 
has not done so in three years. Senate Majority Leader 
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Harry Reid, D-Nev., refused to bring a budget up for a vote 
his year citing pass of the Budget Control Act of 2011. The 
non-partisan Senate parliamentarian later ruled against 
Reid, saying the Budget Control did not remove the 
requirement for the Senate to propose a budget by April 1. 
Senate Budget Committee Chairman Kent Conrad, D-N.D., 
attempted to make a budget in the committee but ultimately 




It may be surprising that the Parliamentarian would have such power. However, as 
presiding chair the Vice-President can ignore the Parliamentarian’s decision,
101
 and 
Majority Leader Reid has in the past overruled a decision on allowing the Minority party 
to introduce amendments to a bill.
102
 These instances are rare however. 
 The Parliamentarian can also serve as cover to the Majority Leader. In the past, 
when the Majority Leader wants to “stay above the fray” and not make a controversial 
decision he/she will defer to the Parliamentarian. This occurred in 2011, “Reid surprised 
colleagues last year when he asked for a ruling to prevent Republicans from forcing votes 
on uncomfortable amendments after the Senate has voted to move to final passage of a 
bill.”
103
 In the end, the Majority Leader does hire the Parliamentarian. However, when 
given the authority and the role they play, the Parliamentarian is a unique fixture of the 
policymaking process. Although the Parliamentarian may not play an essential role in 
determining committee jurisdiction, they can be a determining factor in ensuring 
legislation will pass. 
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 The leadership structure in the Senate is different than the House. The Leader 
does sway influence, but due to the precedent in the Senate, does not hold as much power 
when it comes to jurisdiction disagreement. The Leader does play an important behind 
the scenes role, as evident in the Affordable Care Act but he/she tends not rule by an iron 
first when it comes to jurisdiction. This is mainly due to the unique power of the 
individual senator. It should be noted that each majority leader is different and to infer 
that they may not have an essential role in jurisdictional issues does not mean they are not 
overall powerful. The Leader still sets the agenda and decides whether measures should 
be considered on the floor. The Affordable Care Act demonstrates that when 
jurisdictional issues occur it is best that the Leader ensures the two committees work 
simultaneously and agree upon to merge their bills once they are out of committee.  
Committee Chairman 
 When it comes to jurisdictional issues, the Committee Chairman plays a distinct 
role. They have the power to determine if their committee is to discuss a referred bill, and 
if there is a similar bill working together, he/she intensively works on their bill so that 
provisions they care about will be included in the final bill. During the Affordable Care 
Act the statutory language came from the committees, therefore it is evident that the 
chairman does indeed has a significant role. They can either decide to work together on a 
comprehensive piece of legislation (Affordable Care Act), or play a turf war that will 






 Perhaps the most important actor is that of the individual Senator. As noted 
above, a Senator has immense power outside of the committee structure. He/she has the 
ability to delay any bill, something that House members do not enjoy. This greatly 
diminishes the influential role the committee has in a legislative body. Of course, bills 
will be discussed in committee; however the unpredictability of the power one Senator 
ensures that a bill could be derailed even if jurisdictional conflict was avoided. It appears 
that the power afforded to an individual senator has more of a potential to impede the 
policymaking process than jurisdictional conflict. The individual Senator has more power 
over this process than the Leader, committee chairmen, and the Parliamentarian. 
Conclusion 
 Overall, the jurisdictional conflicts do not impede the policymaking process in the 
Senate. Yes, it can happen, such as the case with the Health Security Act but that in itself 
was not the definitive blow. Other external issues with that particular piece of legislation 
have to be taken into account. Jurisdictional conflict does not impede the policymaking 
process in the Senate because a. it is rare; b. flexible rules and more importantly 
precedents dictate the process; and finally c. the power and unpredictability of the 





Recommendation and Conclusion 
 The purpose of this paper was to analyze jurisdictional conflicts in the U.S. 
Senate. This issue usually occurs in the House, however while it is rare, does occur in the 
Senate. On the surface, one would imagine that the same problems would occur in the 
House as it does in the Senate, just with less frequency. That does not seem to be the 
case. The House and Senate are very different entities. The House follows rules and 
structure while the Senate adheres more to precedent and tradition. The answer to the 
question: whether jurisdictional conflicts impede the policymaking process in the Senate 
is no. The hypothesis of this chapter is confirmed.  
 The Affordable Care Act is a clear indicator that despite there being some sort of 
jurisdictional conflict, Senators where in the end able to overcome it. Working 
simultaneously on separate pieces of legislation, they stayed in their lanes. The 
transaction costs discussed in the literature review were clearly evident. It was not worth 
making such a bill into a matter of a turf war. The bill itself was already controversial; 
there was no need for members to give the bill and themselves more media attention.  
Senators realize that it is easier for them to have their own “pre-conference committee” 
(before the more formal conference committee of the two chambers), to hash out their 
issues. Senators seem to take more interest in the merits of the policy, not whether they 
can claim full credit by winning a turf war. House members in the end rely on 
productivity for legitimacy at home and media coverage. Senators are more high-profiled 
and do not necessarily need the committee process to fulfill this need. 
 Therefore, it is clear that the individual senator, not the Parliamentarian, not the 
Committee Chairman, or even the Majority Leader is the one to blame for impeding 
legislation during the committee process. It is not merely the fault of egotistical 
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committee chairmen trying to demand their way. One Senator can threaten to hold up the 
entire process itself, which is more dangerous than committees deliberating on whom 
gets what in debating a bill. The previous chapter discusses this issue and provides a 
solution in terms of filibuster reform. 
 Is there a solution to this problem? Well, first, the question should be- is there 
actually a problem with the jurisdictional conflict in the Senate. The answer to that would 
be- no. Again, jurisdictional conflict is not the problem. It there was a recommendation to 
be made it would be that this is a prime example why the role of the Majority leader must 
be enhanced. To allow one rogue Senator to hold up the process of duly elected 99 other 
individuals is a monstrosity to the democracy and the policymaking process. In the 
House, a strong speaker has become the norm, so it should be the same with the Senate 
Majority Leader. Of course, just the very fact that it takes 60 votes to pass any 
meaningful piece of legislation may diminish his/her influence. The example of the 
individual Senator also indicates just how weak the committee structure is in the Senate. 
Yes, there are institutional reasons why Senate committees may not be strong to begin 
with (the ability of Senators to be on multiple committees for example which diffuses the 
power structure). However, the very thought of Senators circumventing the process has to 
be disconcerting to those who study the role of committees in the policymaking process. 
The committees are supposed to be where the most deliberation takes place so that 
experts can lend a hand in formulating solid policies. Unfortunately, jurisdictional issues 
in the Senate indicate that while deliberation isn’t totally dead, it does not have a huge 
impact early on in the committee process. 
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 On the surface, one cannot ignore that on average 99% of legislation are not 
multiply referred. To merely say that jurisdictional conflict does impede the process 
because it is rare is not accurate. Other factors in bills failing take precedence. When 
major pieces of legislation do occur, these committees agree to work together and not 
argue over jurisdictional issues. Senators on the whole seem to be more willing than 
House members to work together on jurisdictional issues, because they know that the real 
power they have is outside the committee structure: when they fulfill their role as an 
individual Senator and block legislation they see fit. In order for the Senate to continue to 
be an elite legislative body it must overcomes its obsession with precedent and formalize 





Chapter Four: Leadership Styles in the United States Senate- Important 
in the Policymaking Process? 
 
Introduction 
 The United States Senate is a body where the individual matters. Unlike the 
House, one Senator can “make or break” a piece of legislation. While this is true, the role 
of the majority leader, especially his/her leadership style cannot be ignored. The majority 
leader has quite the impact on the legislative process. From behind the scenes work to 
scheduling legislation, how a majority leads acts is an important ingredient in how 
legislation is shaped in the Senate. This paper will prove that even though the Senate has 
become an institution where individuals reign supreme, the leadership style of the 
majority leader is relevant but this impact is not the “end all be all.” Leadership style in 
the Senate is impacted by historical events and time periods, not necessarily character 
traits. One example one be that the President is the one that dictates policy in the Senate, 
therefore that policy may be watered down in the name of compromise. Another example 
is if partisan interests outweigh pragmatic behavior therefore it may mean that a bill is 
never even debated and brought to a vote in the first place. The power of the individual 
senator through the use of floor procedures makes whatever style a Leader choose almost 
null and void.  
 In order to prove that leadership style does have an impact on such an individual 
based body, three case studies will be conducted. First, will be Majority Leader Mike 
Mansfield who was leader in the 1960s and 1970s. Second, will be Majority Leader Trent 
Lott, who was leader in the 1990s, and the last case study will examine the current 
Majority Leader Harry Reid. All three men have different leadership styles. It will be 
important to compare and contrast these styles and whether they made a difference in the 
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policy process. In the age of filibusters, holds, 24/7 media, presidential speculation, the 
Senate has now more than ever become an institution where one Senator (junior or not) 
can make an outweighed impact. However, as this chapter will show- the majority leader 
in the end is important because their style reverberates not only in the chamber but with 






Literature Review  
Introduction 
 The majority of congressional scholarship on leadership styles focuses on the 
House Speaker. This is not surprising, as the dynamic between the Speaker and the 
membership is an essential part of the legislative process. However, even if the Senate 
Majority Leader may not yield as much power as the Speaker, this scholarship on 
leadership styles is still applicable. Both the Speaker and Senate Majority Leader lead 
their parties and chambers- thus they share the same ultimate goal: the passage of 
preferred legislation. 
Style: The “Czar” 
 A noted congressional leadership style is that of the “czar.” Essentially, the czar 
style relies on both repression and the fact that members depend on the leader to bring 
their legislation to the floor.
104
 This type of style is very common. Indeed, in the House 
this type of style was the impetus for change as committee chairmen demanded more 
power, which in turn reduced the influence of junior members. In the Senate, this type of 
style is desirable. The Senate as an institution gives more influence and power to 
individual members. Therefore, the Majority Leader is in a constant struggle between 
either leading or being a “first amongst equals.” The way to solve this issue is for the 
majority leader to personify this style. Lyndon Johnson is a glowing example of this style 
and he was successful in passing controversial legislation. 
Style: Decentralization the “Bargainer”   
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 The opposite of the czar is the leader who promotes decentralization. 
Decentralization delegates power amongst members, specifically in the committee 
structure.
105
 The leader depends on his/her lieutenants (committee chairs) to pass their 
preferred legislation. This style promotes a sense of deliberation and bargaining. During 
the deliberation process, bargaining is extremely important in improving legislation and 
increasing its chances of passage. It can be argued that this style is not preferred by the 
leader. It is risky because by releasing power the leader does not have any control over 
the legislative process. The likelihood that the bill he/she supports may not be what the 
leader recommended or wanted. This type of style seems to have been forced upon the 
leader by members in the caucus/conference. This style may be viewed as one of 
weakness; however, it does promote deliberation and a healthy environment in the 
legislative body. Therefore it perhaps best viewed as one of pragmatism.  
Style: Personalized 
 The third type of leadership style is a personalized approach.
106
 Those who 
embodied this style would be Lyndon Johnson.
107
 This is ultimately a style that is based 
upon the “power of persuasion.”
108
 These leaders were successful in cultivating 
relationships on a personal level. The members of their caucus/conference felt a sense of 
duty and loyalty, which in turn kept them in check. These leaders also demonstrated a 
keen sense of accommodation and empathy.
109
 Inter-personal skills make these leaders 
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 Patterson, Party Leadership, 396. 
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effective and successful. This style is a true embodiment of the meaning of a politician. 
This style demands the loyalty of the membership by accommodating their needs. 
Leadership is Situational 
 The leadership styles described above paint a broad picture of the different styles 
implemented by Leaders of the past. Styles are relevant to the policy process and 
depending on the given situation a Leader will choose which one works best. It is 
important to note that Leadership styles are situational.
110
 Indeed, the Leader also has to 
deal with the “limits” impose by the Senate’s structure.
111
 The structure itself forces the 
leader to be adaptable. Leaders that recognize when different situations have occurred 
and by responding proper will ultimately be successful.  
Conclusion 
 The literature does point out that the leadership styles are relevant and should be 
studied as part of the policymaking process. However, due to the situational nature of 
these styles, overall it may have a limited impact. Regardless, as a body of individuals, it 
is important to study how the Leadership interacts with the membership in pursing major 
policy initiatives. It is apparent that Leaders must recognize different situations and that it 
is difficult to be consistent with their type of style. It is an important part of the policy 
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Description of Evidence 
 This chapter will study the impact of Senate leadership style on the policymaking 
process by using three case studies of previous Majority Leaders. The first case study is 
on the tenure of Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT). This will focus primarily on the 
Senator’s role in passing major pieces of legislation that had national importance. The 
second case study focuses on the tenure of Senator Trent Lott (R-MS). This case study 
examines Senator Lott’s interaction with increasingly conservative conference. The last 
case study examines Senator Harry Reid (D-NV). This case study primarily focuses the 
modern era of the Senate where obstruction reigns supreme. 
 These case studies will be different as the three Leaders were in their positions in 
distinctly different times. Senator Mansfield’s for example, will examine his role in major 
national legislation, such as civil rights and had more of a deferred role to the executive. 
On the contrary Senators Lott and Reid had to deal with frustration within their own 
ranks. While these studies will yield different outcomes, all of them will include the 
number of bills passed during each Leader’s tenure. This will help to determine the 
productivity of their tenure as this thesis is ultimately studying positive outcomes 
(passage of bills) in determining the Senate’s impact on the policymaking process. 
Methods of Analysis 
 The three case studies above will help answer my hypothesis, which is that the 
Majority Leader has an impact on the legislative process however their leadership style is 
not the most important key of this influence. All three case studies come from different 
eras and the three leaders will have their styles tested. However, by comparing their 
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styles to the historic eras of which these leaders serve, one will be able to understand that 
























Michael Mansfield- Deference to the Executive 
Style of Leadership 
Senator Michael “Mike” Mansfield (D-Montana) was the Senate Majority Leader 
from January 1961-January 1977. During Mansfield’s tenure as Majority Leader the 
United States underwent considerable social change at both home and abroad. Mansfield 
also entered the leadership role after succeeding Lyndon Johnson, whom by all accounts 
certainly possessed strong leadership skills in his role as Leader. In fact, Mansfield was 
reluctant in taking the role after Johnson became Vice President.
112
 Also, in the beginning 
of Mansfield’s tenure as Leader, the Kennedy-Johnson Administration had enormous 
influence in his office due to staffing arrangements.
113
 When he was Majority Leader, 
Lyndon Johnson was known for hire tireless work ethic and intense pressure on his 
colleague. One can view Mansfield’s style of leadership as a rebuke of the Johnson’s 
intensity and could be described as “humble.”
114
 Senator Thruston Morton (D-KY) 
described Mansfield as “starting out too easy” and was more accommodating to his 
colleagues need than Johnson.
115
 Indeed, the leadership styles of these two men were 
completely different. 
A major component of a Leader’s role is his/her relationship with the committee 
system. Mansfield took his humble style of leadership in this arena as well. Mansfield 
gave control of the Senate agenda to the Steering Committee. Not only did he give more 
control to the Steering Committee, Mansfield was not a proponent of persuading or 
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 Thruston Morton, Interview with Thruston Morton, (Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, 





 In fact, his style was so lenient that Senator William Proxmire (D-
WI) said that “Mansfield felt that it wasn’t his function” to persuade or push bills.
117
 This 
too was in sharp contrast to Johnson. 
While there was both a Democratic President and a Republican President 
Mansfield was a proponent of deferring to their administration’s agenda.
118
 While there 
was a Democratic President, Mansfield has been quoted as saying, “my job is to represent 
the Senate to the president, and the president to the Senate.
119
 Numerous phone records 
between Johnson and Mansfield indicate that he would refer to him as “boss.”
120
 While 
there was divided government during his tenure, Mansfield “seemed to flounder and 
return to the status quo of deference to the president.”
121
 Essentially as Hatcher writes, 
was that “an important duty of his [Mansfield’s] majority leadership- to buffer the 
president against himself,
122
 therefore deference was the logical choice. However, 
Mansfield’s was not consulted on escalation matters with Vietnam
123
 (he was a staunch 
opponent) is an example of how is commitment to  in presidential deference may have 
diminished his influence in framing the Senate’s foreign policy during the Johnson 
Administration. 
One may assume that Mansfield was a “push-over,” however this not a matter of 
being weak or not; but a case of an individual who realized how the office of Senate 
Majority Leader is constrain by forces outside of his control- specifically how the 
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president exerts control and influence on the chamber. Mansfield saw it as his obligation, 
particularly to a president of his own party that he worked for him, not with him. In fact 
Mansfield once said that if there was such a great difference between a president of his 
own party and himself that could not be rectified, he would resign.
124
 This is in sharp 
contrast to how other Majority Leaders would react in similar circumstances. 
Important Legislation 
It is important to remember that Mansfield’s tenure as Leader implemented 
extraordinary legislation during his tenure. While some would argue that it was the 
president’s agenda, because Mansfield would defer to him, it still had to pass the Senate.  
In order to evaluate Mansfield’s leadership style holistically, one must study how two of 
the important pieces of legislation in the modern era: the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
In 1959, while he was the Majority Whip and during a previous civil rights 
resolution, Mansfield said in regards to civil rights and Senate leadership in general: 
If the leadership of the Senate, particularly the 
leadership of the majority, has any function at all is 
to separate the possible from the presumptuous, and 
then to see to it that this body works to bring about 
the possible. The distinguished majority leader is 




“The possible from the presumptuous,” that is certainly representative of how Mansfield 
viewed leadership qualities in the Senate. Pragmatic and accommodating would be words 
that would describe this approach to leadership. Mansfield accepted reality as he 
continued in this civil rights 1959 speech, “the Senate can do many things, but there are 
some laws which cannot do. It can share in the making of the laws, but it cannot 








administer or enforce the law. The Senate can point the way to leadership, but it cannot 
itself lead.”
126
 Mansfield understood that the Senate was a player in the larger scheme of 
government, it had a role, but not “thee” role.  However for civil rights, with two-thirds 
of a majority needed to end southern filibusters, Mansfield would continue his belief in 
being fair, but also now had to be stern. Now as the Majority Leader, Mansfield had an 
important role in passing historic legislation. Although two civil rights acts were passed 
in 1957 and 1960 respectively, these laws were limited in scope. President Johnson made 
Civil Rights the essential hallmark of his agenda after President Kennedy was 
assassinated. On February 10, 1964 the House of Representatives voted for the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 290-130.
127
 The bill was sent to the Senate for its consideration. In 
what proved to be the most important decision during his tenure:  
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) then 
took an unusual step: Instead of referring the bill to a 
committee, he made a motion to place the bill directly onto 
the Senate calendar. Numerous Senators objected, arguing 
that it was vital for a committee to examine the bill. 





The Civil Rights Act would have been doomed in the committee; this action ensured its 
survival in the Senate. It would not be easy, as the Senate Historic Office writes:  
Minnesota Senator Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic whip 
who managed the bill on the Senate floor, enlisted the aid 
of Republican Minority Leader Everett M. Dirksen of 
Illinois. Dirksen, although a longtime supporter of civil 
rights, had opposed the bill because he objected to certain 
provisions. Humphrey therefore worked with him to redraft 
the controversial language and make the bill more 
acceptable to Republicans. Once the changes were made, 
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Dirksen gained key votes for cloture from his party 
colleagues with a powerful speech calling racial integration 
‘an idea whose time has come.’
129
   
 
It took months and key amendments but the Senate finally arose to the occasion that 
Mansfield hope the body would in 1959. True to his form, Mansfield made sure he would 
accommodate his fellow colleagues, even those who opposed him on this issue. In the 
minutes recording his meeting Senator Richard Russell, Mansfield stressed that he would 
keep the opposition informed. Also Mansfield stated that the legislation was in the best 
interest of the President and the Party and that he would ultimately ask for their help.
130
 
Such accommodation and thought would be a rare occurrence today. 
Success at Passing Measures 
Table 2 
Number of Measures Passed in the Senate during Senator Mansfield’s Tenure as 
Majority Leader: 
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Senator Mansfield had an impressive number of measures passed during his 
tenure. The average number throughout his time as Majority Leader is 869. It is 
interesting to note that the number of measures passed decline during the latter half of his 
tenure. This is perhaps due to the situation in Vietnam and its impact a creating a more 
toxic environment in the chamber.  
 
Conclusion 
 Senator Mansfield’s leadership style can be seen as controversial for those who 
are wary of presidential power. Controversial yes, but Mansfield’s style was forced upon 
him due to the historic events of his time. Civil rights was a national issue at heart, as 
sectionalism was hampering this effort.  Mansfield was correct in allowing the President 
to become a major player on this issue and his ability to adapt allowed for the Senate to 
pass such historic legislation.  
 Was Mansfield subservient to the President? It can be argued that he was, 
however, it is apparent that Mansfield was doing what he thought was in the best interest 
of the institution. It can be argued that Mansfield did not work for but he worked with 
administration, acting as a type of liaison, even as issues such as the Vietnam War, which 
is opposed. However, this was certainly not an equal relationship due to the constraints of 
the Senate as an institution.  
 Mansfield’s tenure indicates that the Senate’s institutional constraints and historic 
events had more of an impact than his general style. The institutional problem of 
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sectionalism in the Senate forced Mansfield to difference to the President nationalized the 
issue. The historic events of Civil Rights, Great Society, and the Vietnam War also called 
for bold national leadership that only the President can provide. Mansfield had to adapt, 








Trent Lott-The “Pragmatic” Partisan Warrior 
Leadership Style 
In 1995, Senator Trent Lott (R-MS), became the Majority Whip after his party 
gained the majority. This was not the typical Republican majority found in the Senate. In 
the past, the parties would go back-and-forth in securing majorities, while the Democrats 
would dominate the House. In 1994, this all changed, as the Republican Party headed by 
Newt Gingrich’s “contract with America” ignited a conservative revolution that allowed 
for Republicans to win up and down the ballot. When the new congress was gaveled into 
session in January of 1995, Robert Dole (R-KS) was the Leader. Lott had an extremely 
competitive race for the whip position, as he beat Senator Alan Simpson R-WY) by only 
one vote.
131
 However, as it became apparent that he could not run for president and still 
be an effective Leader, Dole resigned in June of 1996. This capped a career that he had 
been working on since his days in the House of Representatives starting in the 1970s. 
In terms of obtaining party leadership, Trent Lott comes from a very traditional 
background. Andrea Hatcher writes, as the whip Lott “operated as deal-maker and vote-
counter while building a constituency that would support him as majority leader.”
132
 Not 
only did he have the experience and the relationships, Lott did have a conservative streak 
to him that demanded the respect of his the new conservative majority. Not only was he 
ideologically driven, Lott was a partisan, “Lott can be ferociously partisan, as when he 
made headlines for his remarks implying that Republicans and Democrats use ‘different 
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sides of their brains.’”
133
 However, being a partisan does not necessarily mean you will 
receive the reins to lead your party in the Senate. 
Lott has been described as a partisan on the outside but a pragmatic politician on 
the inside. Hatcher writes, “His [Lott] senatorial career was one of aggregation of 
experience in which Lott established strong credentials that masked what many outsiders 
viewed as a hard core of conservative ideology.”
134
 However, as Cloud notes,  
Yet Lott also has a pragmatic streak that is sometimes at 
odds with his image as an ideologically driven 
conservative… Lott has pushed - sometimes quietly, 
sometimes openly - for Republicans to put aside their hope 





Also, with a new Republican majority resulted in a new expectation of the relationship 
between members of the conference and the leader. Cloud writes,  
From the start, Lott, 54, has demonstrated a kinship with 
the group of aggressive, young and conservative senators, 
many of whom he knows from the House. ‘There is 
something of a generational change going on. There are a 
few of the World War II-era people still here, but I do have 
a little different style,’ he says. When junior senators talk 
about wanting a new style of leadership, they describe a 
leader who is more approachable and more inclined to 




Junior members expected that Lott would be more approachable because they saw him as 
“one of them.” This is another hallmark of his pragmatic style of leadership. 
 While Senate insiders will claim that Lott was a pragmatic force, his 
ideological/partisan past made him a controversial choice as Leader according to many 
outside observers. A Rolling Stone profile painted Lott in a negative light and not as a 
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pragmatic statesman. William Greider writes, “Senator Lott frequently pops off, perhaps 
a symptom of his own frustrations or insecurity as majority leader. Last summer [1998], 
for instance, he delivered an impromptu jeremiad against gays that sounded gratuitously 
hostile coming from someone in such an influential position.”
137
 Also, Greider paints Lott 
as not being driven policy wise by national (as one may expect a Leader to be), but 
interested in trivial matters in Mississippi:  
He pursues a broad range of local causes, some quite 
trivial, some unseemly for a majority leader. Last year, for 
instance, colleagues were shocked when Lott tried a 
legislative end run to lengthen the duck-hunting season in 
his home state. Then, at the last minute, Lott tacked into the 
year-end omnibus budget bill a provision that forgives a 





One can argue that this is an attribute of pragmatic leadership. As the majority leader, 
Lott knew that he could use the pork-barrel system to affirm his popularity at home, 
while he could be a national leader for the Republican Party in Washington. 
Noted Tenure- Impeachment Proceedings And Resignation 
 Trent Lott is perhaps best known for his role during the Clinton impeachment 
proceedings. In the fall of 1998, Clinton was impeached by the House on charges of 
perjury and obstruction of justice. Lott knew that as a Republican leader he would take a 
significant role in casting Clinton as being unfit for the presidency. Unlike Mansfield, he 
did not see his role as deferring to the executive. Yes, the fact that Clinton was not a 
member of the same party certainly played a role, but Lott went even further than simply 
ensuring that the Senate was a co-equal partner in the government. Lott wanted to make 
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the executive look beholden to the Congress, while a trial would help this cause, he did 
not want Clinton to dominate the Senate’s agenda. 
 During the impeachment crisis, Lott questioned if Clinton had the moral stance to 
be president of the United States.
139
 Since he successfully was able to work up the ranks 
of leadership, Lott was an astute politician. As such, Lott “maintained a scrupulously low 
profile on impeachment.”
140
 In fact, Lott was not even in Washington while the House 
impeachment proceedings were taking place.
141
 Before the trial, Lott was “taking the 
relatively safe course of pushing for a quick Senate trial, even though he knows that 
White House lawyers will dictate the timing, at least in the early stages. He is determined 
that, no matter how long the pre-trial wrangling, he will not allow Clinton's case to 
consume the Senate.”
142
 Although he wanted to make his conservative colleagues gleeful 
at the fact that they were aiming at Clinton, he did not want him to have the upper hand. 
 Lott knew that his side did not have the necessary two-thirds majority to remove 
Clinton from office. He viewed a quick trial as ensuring that his conference would 
support him and that the Senate would not become a spectacle. After the trial, the 
Republican brand was hurt. The party had to move on with its agenda “Senate Majority 
Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss., and House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert, R-Ill., both seem 
inclined toward pragmatism.”
143
 However, his leadership quality- pragmatism was 
damaged. Even though the trial was relatively quick, the outcome was not surprising. 
Conservative junior members were disappointed and Lott’s reputation was damaged. 
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Get Back to Legislating. (CQ Weekly: 1999), 354. 
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 Lott’s tenure as majority leader quickly came to an end in June 2001, after 
Senator Jim Jeffords (VT) left the conference and became an independent. His time as 
Republican leader ended abruptly on December 20, 2002. Weeks earlier, Lott said “’If 
the rest of the country had followed our lead [in voting for Strom Thurmond as 
president], we wouldn’t have had all these problems over all these years, either.’”
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Indeed, his checkered past with racial issues consumed his pragmatism on that December 
day. With his colleagues flustered that they were in the minority and an offensive stance 
that certainly did not help the party brand, Lott was forced to resign. His years as a 
pragmatist may have served him well in obtaining the leadership, but in the end his 
strident ideology prevailed. 
Success at Passing Measures 
Table 3 
Number of Measures Passed in the Senate during Leader’s Lott’s Tenure as 
Majority Leader: 
 








Source: Senate Historical Office 
 
*Took office June 12, 1996, undeterminable number from Congressional Resume 
Activity 
**Resigned from office June 6, 2001: undeterminable number from Congressional 
Resume Activity 
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 The average number of measures passed during Senator Lott’s tenure is 534. This 
number is smaller than Senator Mansfield’s. This lower production rate can is attributed 
to the hyper polarization of the Senate that came to a head during this era.   
Conclusion 
 Senator Lott’s tenure as Majority Leader was tenuous at best. It can ultimately be 
said that it was not successful, as he was forced to resign from a controversial statement. 
Lott had to deal with a Republican conference that was primarily focused on removing a 
president from office. Lott knew that this political was damaging, but in his pragmatic 
way allowed for a trial that allowed his membership to highlight their vitriol opposition to 
President Clinton.  Lott was constrained by an institution that promotes individualism, 
and particularly in the new era of cable television that arose, the Senate became more of 
spectacle than a body of deliberation. This pragmatic style may have kept some members 
of his party contempt, it was not enough break through the gridlock needed to pass major 
pieces of legislation.  
 Lott was not afforded the opportunity to tackle the “major” issues, as he was 
concerned about making his conference in check and holding onto power. He was 
successful in that he was not ousted, but Lott did not personalize his relationship like 
other Leaders. Lott found himself with little support from his fellow Republican Senators 
when he made those controversial statements about race. Lott’s ultimate failure to keep 
his conference at bay ushered in a new era where the Senate is not just a not a vehicle for 
productive legislation activity. The institutional problems of the Senate were victorious 




Harry Reid- A Partisan but Determined Leader 
Style of Leadership 
 Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) became the majority leader after a Democratic wave 
in 2006. Having served as the minority leader for the previous two years, Reid set out to 
fully implement the Democratic agenda since the House was also won by the Democrats. 
Reid, like Lott, worked methodically up the ranks of leadership. Reid was first a 
representative then in 1986 was elected to the Senate. Before becoming minority leader in 
January 2005, Reid served as Senator Tom Daschle’s Whip. After Daschle lost his 
reelection effort in November 2004, Reid became the choice to lead the Democratic 
caucus. Reid took the reins of leadership with a slim majority in January 2007; he knew 
that he had to run a “tight-leash” in order for his caucus to be successful. 
 If there was only one word that could describe Reid’s leadership style it would be 
“determination.” As Daphne Retter wrote: 
Reid’s operating style has changed very little from the 
previous two years, when he was the minority leader and 
received high marks — glowing from his own side, 
grudging from the GOP — for his skill at finding ways to 
close Democratic ranks for or against the question of the 
day. He has acted hardly at all as a legislative diplomat or 
dealmaker, but almost always as a partisan with what his 





During his first congress as Leader, Reid had to make sure his caucus was discipline. It 
was the final two years of the Bush administration and was determined to undermine his 
unpopular agenda. It should be noted however that as a minority leader, it is easier to be 
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partisan as you are not expected to pass legislation. However, Reid took this style and 
approach to him when he became the majority leader. 
 It is clear that Reid knows how to keep his caucus in line. During the first 100 
days of his tenure:   
With his efforts almost entirely focused on his own flock, 
Reid was able during his first 100 days to persuade the 
typical Democratic caucus member to stay in the fold on 19 
of every 20 votes that fell mainly along party lines, which 
were about half of all the floor votes between January and 
the spring recess. The typical Republican, in the same 





Yes, due to the slim majority obviously Reid was forced to be very tough on his own 
caucus, but it is an affirmation of his style: a determined partisan that would do anything 
to achieve his agenda. It should be noted that this style is different that LBJ’s, who was 
known to work with an iron first on his colleagues. Manu Raju writes:  
[Reid] unlike his Democratic predecessor, Tom Daschle — 
prides himself in taking a hands-off approach and giving 
his committee barons wide latitude to do their work…Reid, 
in his fourth term, is expert at working the arcane 
procedures of the Senate to keep the chamber running, and 
he generally prefers results over specific policy positions. 
He doesn’t employ LBJ-like tactics on senators, who have 





Reid’s leadership style demonstrates that determination means perseverance and an 
emphasis on results over dictating or heavy handedness. Indeed, his caucus has responded 
positively to this style. 
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While some may call Reid’s style determined, others would give it another name: 
“tenacious.” Jennifer Steinhauer writes about his leadership style, “how tenacious Mr. 
Reid is willing to be — and whether he will extract votes one by one as he has for other 
big pieces of legislation — may well determine the fate of the measures.”
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 Whether he 
is a tenacious leader or very determined, it is difficult to argue against the fact that Reid 
has been a successful leader in terms of passing major legislation and achieve results. 
Those on the other side of the aisle see him as overtly partisan who does not believe in 
compromise. However, there may be another reason why Reid is adverse to compromise 
than simply calling him a partisan. 
 As discussed in a previous chapter, the use of the filibuster has increased vastly 
over the last decade. The use of the filibuster is of course not new; however, since Reid’s 
tenure it has been used to a point where gridlock and dysfunction has characterized the 
Senate. In order to stop a filibuster, Reid must conjure 60 votes to stop it. At a time he did 
have these votes, but for the majority of his tenure he has not. One would think that this 
would cause him to compromise to create a supermajority, but the Republicans have 
shown little indication that they too are willing to buck. The determination or 
“tenaciousness” may stem not simply from a partisan standpoint, but one that evolves 
from a view that the Senate must enact legislation and that for the sake of the body it 
cannot merely be a place where policy or action is not accomplished. Thus, as mentioned 
in the first chapter, Reid changed filibuster rules for presidential nominations (this has 
been repealed been called the “nuclear option” by the media). This can be seen as 
Congress giving more power to the executive (as it has been for decades and Obama Reid 
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are the same party), or it can be viewed as step in a direction for maintaining the integrity 
of the Senate. By this action, Reid will now be seen as a momentous majority leader. 
Obviously, whether one thinks that is a positive or negative connotation will come from 
their partisan view. 
Accomplishment- Determination and the Affordable Care Act 
 Mike Mansfield was known to defer to the executive. Trent Lott was known to be 
a partisan against the executive. Harry Reid, for the duration of his tenure that the 
executive was a Democrat, has been known to work hand-in-hand, and even take the lead 
from the executive. The debate over the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act is a prime example of Reid’s determination. The legislative history behind this 
law is extremely interesting. Reid gave concessions to conservative Democrat Ben 
Nelson (D-NE) to ensure his support of the original bill.
149
 It passed with Nelson’s 60
th
 
vote.  However, the untimely death of Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) and the unexpected 
victory of his Republican replacement Scott Brown, made it impossible for Reid to 
bulldoze pass a filibuster, as the House and Senate bills were different, and forced the bill 
to scale down in terms of policy impact. 
 In the end, Reid and Democratic leaders were able to pass the healthcare 
legislation through the reconciliation process, which by law, only needed a simple 
majority to invoke cloture because it involves changing the budget. Jonathan Chait 
explains:  
Now that they've lost the ability to break a filibuster, 
Democrats plan to have the House pass the Senate bill, and 
then use reconciliation to enact changes to the Senate bill 
demanded by the House. These changes -- higher subsidy 
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levels, different kinds of taxes to pay for them, nixing the 
Nebraska Medicaid deal -- mainly involve taxes and 
spending. In other words, they're exactly the kinds of 




This legislative history is a testament of Reid’s determination and grit. Determined to get 
something, anything, accomplished was his main motivation. Reid was willing to give 
concessions that at the time were very controversial. Realizing that he could break a 
Republican filibuster, Reid, for the sake of accomplishing something, agreed to scale 
down the bill and support a bill that was not as aggressive as the original piece of 
legislation. Changing the filibuster rules on nominations and passing the Affordable Care 
act are prime examples that Reid is concerned about the Senate not falling victim to 
gridlock- something no matter how small is a victory in the end.  
Table 4  
 
Number of Measures Passed in the Senate during Senator Reid’s Tenure as 
Majority Leader: 
 











Source: Us Senate Historic Office 
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 The average number of measures passed during Senator Reid’s tenure as Majority 
Leader is 499.  This number is indicative of the current situation in the Senate, an 
institution that gridlock reigns supreme.  
Conclusion 
 Senator Reid had a productive tenure as Majority Leader. Senator Reid faced 
similar concerns that Senator Lott did but instead of trying to find a diplomatic solution, 
Reid became a force to be reckon with,  The process of passing the Affordable Care Act 
(which was examined in the previous chapter), is a remarkable achievement. This is 
attributed to his strong determination and personalized relationship with members of 
caucus. Ultimately, due to how the Senate works as an institution, it was a legislative 
procedure and tactic that passed the bill, not his style. 
 The style remained relevant throughout the process, but without using a 
legislative tactic that would not require the 60 vote threshold to invoke cloture the bill 
would not have succeeded. This is a key example of the Senate’s institutional rules and 
norms having the most impact on whether a piece of legislation passes, not the leadership 
style of the Leader. Yes, Leader Reid used that legislative procedure, but this was merely 










Analysis & Conclusion 
Styles of Leadership- Impact on the Policy Process  
 It is apparent that the three leaders studied, Mike Mansfield, Trent Lott, and Harry 
Reid, have different leadership styles. It is also apparent, that even though individual 
senators have increased their power through the holding process and filibustering (as 
mentioned in the first chapter), leadership style is still relevant in determining the public 
policy process in the Senate. Yet, ultimately these institutional constraints such as floor 
procedures have more of an impact. Styles are fluid and unpredictable, as it is a reaction 
to current events institutional constraints.  The majority leader is an important actor. To 
claim that a majority leader is not relevant in the modern Senate because it is such an 
“individual” institution would be misguided. As these case studies have proven, 
leadership style can overcome the individualized nature of Senate, but also, usually it 
does lose out to this factor as well.   
 Mansfield’s deference to this day has had a lasting impact on the relationship 
between the congress and the president. Indeed, being the president’s political actor in the 
body weakened the role of the leader. Obviously, partisan considerations certainly are 
true, but one can still be a partisan but not be used as a “puppet” for the administration. 
Harry Reid is a prime example of this dichotomy. Instead of viewing himself as a 
“puppet” of the Obama administration, Reid has attempted to act as a co-equal partner. 
Now, this may partly be in truth due to Obama allowing Reid and then Speaker Nancy 




 From an outside perspective Trent Lott would seem to possess the best leadership 
characteristic. A successful majority leader should both be pragmatic when he/she needs 
to be, but also needs to be partisan so that he/she maintains the support of the 
caucus/conference. Lott had these attributes. However, Lott was did not show enough 
partisanship. The Clinton impeachment process made it possible for Lott to lose the trust 
of his colleagues. Perhaps he should not have taken a backseat role during the House 
proceedings. Lott’s call for a quick trial was also suspect to his conference. Pragmatism 
and partisanship usually do not go hand-in-hand. At some point, one has to overcome the 
other. Lott knew that Clinton would not be removed from office and that the process was 
hurting the Republican brand, but this pragmatic approach sealed his fate. Lott did not 
possess the right amount of partisanship during a time when polarization was starting to 
take hold of the American political process. 
 As of late 2013, Harry Reid has proven himself to be a very effective leader. Not 
very known for his brashness, Reid has allowed his caucus to be free yet at the same time 
they have such a high confidence in him that for the most part they do not stray too far 
away. Out of the three leaders studied, this type of leadership style is the best. Reid has 
ensured that the Senate would be a major player in the policy process but being more 
productive (yes, it is not very productive, but in terms of major policy the Senate has 
accomplished quite a bit under Reid). Reid’s style has also ensured that the Senate is not 
beholden to the wishes of the administration.  Perseverance and determination does allow 
for some compromise to occur, but it does not change the overall character of certain 
legislative items. It also demands respect, which in a body where there are 100 very 
strong political actors is a noteworthy accomplishment. It will be interesting to observe 
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how Reid’s style remains during the rest of his tenure. One thing will not change though 
and that is his emphasis on results and ensuring that the Senate does not become a place 
where radical ideologues dictate the agenda. 
Conclusion  
 The leadership style of the Senate Majority Leader does matter in the public 
policy process. However it is the strategy and tactics used by the Leader that is influential 
during the process, not their style. Leadership style is a reaction to policy issues during a 
certain time period, therefore is fluid and unpredictable. Legislation in the Senate is 
dependent upon how the majority leader acts- whether he/she compromises or promotes 
gridlock, whether he/she is open to compromise or partisanship, and whether he/she 
promotes legislative branch driven policy or acting in a subservient role to the executive. 
This is a sense of strategy of ensuring the Senate is a major player during the process, not 
a style.  
 The strategy and tactics of the majority leader impacts the policy process in the 
following ways. First, it impacts what the relationship is between the administration and 
the Senate, namely whether who dictates policy. This style may change when a president 
or majority leader is not of the same party, but it still has an enormous impact on the 
process. Second, leadership styles have an impact on the relationship between the role of 
the conference/caucus has on producing legislation. An example of this relationship is 
whether junior members or ideologues have a say on a matter, or whether the Leader 
himself has input on a particular bill greatly affects the final product. Lastly, leadership 
style impacts the very content of the bill. It is important to note if a leader promotes 
compromise (to some that would be watering down a piece of legislation), or whether a 
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leader is “hell-bent” on passing a piece of legislation as it is written. These different 
styles can certainly change the very content of the bill.  
 However, due to the fact that leadership styles are impacted by historic time 
periods and events and not just character traits, it has been observed that styles are fluid. 
This fluidity is the reason why leadership style is not the most important facet of the 
legislative process. Floor procedure that was discussed in the first chapter, is more rigid 
and therefore has a more lasting impact overall on the policy making process. Majority 
Leaders do matter, but their style does not as historic time periods forced their reactions 
to the policy issues of their time. Majority The way Leaders do have an impact on the 
policymaking process is their strategy and tactics they use, not their overall style. 
 The Senate is a body of 100 influential actors. However, the majority leader is 
still the main actor. He/she can easily change legislation by the very nature of his/her 
leadership style. The leadership style of the majority leader determines whether a bill is 
watered down, if it ever receives a vote, or if it is pushed enough to break through 
partisan gridlock.  Like the president and speaker of the House, the Senate majority 
leader has an important role in the policy process. However, it may not be the most 
important actor in this relationship, as he/she has to continuously struggle with a body 




Chapter Five: Conclusion- How The Senate Must Change 
 As one can see, the Senate plays an important role in the policymaking process. 
The three main facets that were discussed in the preceding chapters demonstrate that as 
an institution, the Senate is far from being perfect. This paper has examined how these 
facets impact the legislative process and what recommendations, if any, should be made. 
However, the Senate is a complex legislative body to study, and further work in others 
should be applied to complete a larger picture. 
Floor Procedures 
 By far the most negative aspect of the Senate on the policymaking process is the 
abuse of the filibuster. The original intent of the filibuster was to ensure that the minority 
was protected. In the modern era, however, that is far from the case. This is not new 
though. Even as early as the late 1800s, it became apparent that this filibuster was being 
abused. This issue became such a problem that in a body that is notoriously slow to 
change its rules and procedures the Senate decided to implement a cloture vote that 
would end a filibuster. This proved to work in the Senate until the 1950s and 1960s when 
controversial issues were held up due to the objectives of a minority of Senators. The 
problem was further exacerbated when the Senate created a two-tier system which 
effectively allows Senators to block legislation by the usage of holds. This system was 
originally intended to alleviate the gridlock caused by filibusters; however, its impact has 
been the exact opposite. 
 The filibuster has also increased the individual nature of the Senate. Senators are 
extremely powerful as all it takes is one Senator to hold up and stop the legislative 
process. This in no way should be an interpretation of protecting minority rights. What 
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was originally intended as a positive step for democracy has transformed into an 
authoritarian mechanism. The institution is larger than one individual, however, the rules 
and norms that of the institution has been conducive for such behavior to exist. That must 
end, for the sake of the policymaking process and democracy the status quo must change. 
Recommendations 
 This paper recommends that the filibuster should be abolished as we know it, 
meaning that cloture can be invoked by a simple majority vote. Before spelling out the 
reason why, one should examine the arguments of why it should not end and other 
alternatives that exist. Those who support the filibuster believe that it is a necessary part 
of the policymaking process because it slows the process down. This, they argue is good 
for democracy as it does not allow for knee-jerk reactions and promotes slow deliberation 
of policies- which they see was an original intent of the Senate. The author of this paper 
disagrees. What separates the US from a parliamentary system is that it has numerous 
checks and balances that, as part of the policymaking process, inevitably “slows down” 
legislation. The filibuster was not created by the founding fathers and is merely a Senate 
procedure and not part of an overall political theory like checks and balances. There is 
ample opportunity for slowing down legislation in the Senate that does not involve the 
filibuster. Namely one can use the amendment process, which does allow for the minority 
views to be heard. 
 Abolishing the filibuster as we know it would also solve the tension between 
individualism and the body’s role in the policymaking process. Without the ability of 
Senators holding legislation, it takes away the individual nature of the Senate and 
empowers the institution as a whole. Senators can still exert their influence in other areas 
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in committee and the amendment process. They cannot however, take the Senate for 
hostage and would be forced to work with their members in constructing policy- making 
the Senate a more deliberative place.  
 Some have proposed alternatives or more moderate fixes to the filibuster. One of 
these alternatives includes mandating that in order for one to filibuster a Senator must on 
the floor, the best example of this would be the main character’s notorious filibuster in 
Mr. Smith Goes to Washington. This would abolish holds by senators and would put the 
burden back on the minority, not the majority as the system currently does. Another 
approach is to reduce the threshold required to invoke cloture- whether the number would 
be reduce gradually as a filibuster begins or to just reduce the number to 55. This would 
make it easier to invoke cloture. 
 These fixes are not bad and could potentially fix the overall problem of gridlock; 
however, this author opposes the filibuster from both a practical and principled matter. In 
the United States, elections matter. The filibuster, whether in its current form or 
reformed, is anti-democratic in nature. It has made elections for the US Senate almost 
irrelevant, as in order to advance the majority party’s policies they must have a super-
majority. The people voted for one particular party over the other to control the Senate, 
and in any republic their voices should win out. That is not the current dynamic and it is 
harmful to both the process of passing legislation as the institution loses legitimacy and 
for democracy as the majority does not control- authoritarian individuals senators do. The 
filibuster, once a procedure that promotes democratic values by protecting minority rights 




 Is this realistic? Yes, if one looks at the Senate’s history, this would not be the 
most dramatic change to happen. The direct election of Senators is much more profound 
change to the institution. The Senate has been able to adapt and change before, and it can 
do the same when it comes to the filibuster. Also the recent change of the filibuster to 
executive nominations is an indication that totally abolishment could one day come. After 
this rule change, full abolishment it not much fantasy anymore. 
Committees 
 With given any legislative body that has a committee system, “turf wars” over 
what each committee has jurisdiction over is inevitable. This is major problem in the 
House, has it exacerbates further issues such as the relationship between senior and junior 
members and the relationship between the Speaker and committee chairmen. However, 
this problem of committee turf wars is not as prevalent an issue in the Senate. This can be 
attributed to the individual nature of the Senate. The committee structure itself is not as 
strong as the House due to how the institution allows for individual senators to be so 
powerful. This dynamic though is, surprisingly beneficial to the policymaking process. 
The weaker committee structure promotes a sense of deliberation between committees, 
not jurisdictional fights. 
 As discussed in one of the previous chapters, an example of this deliberation even 
extends to one of the most controversial issues the Senate has tackled: healthcare reform. 
Instead of arguing what committee gets what, this issue was divided amongst multiple 
committees and then merged into one bill. In the House, the committee system is made 
for an individual to make a name for themselves, a Senator does not need a committee to 
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gain power or more become influential. They already have that influence given the nature 
of the institution. 
Recommendations 
 The current structure of the Senate committee system positively impacts the 
policymaking process. This author makes no recommendations for change. The current 
system allows for deliberation and even on the most controversial issues promotes 
cooperation. Senators do not use committees to block legislation, as they have the power 
to filibuster. If the filibuster would be abolished could senators use committees to block 
legislation? Not exactly. With the amendment process, senators could delay bills in 
committee but ultimately the majority vote would win.  
Leadership 
 The Majority Leader of the Senate is a key player in the policymaking process. 
This individual is constrained by the institution. Therefore the leader has to develop a 
certain style of leadership as an attempt to overcome these constraints. There are different 
types of styles that can be adopted. One style is that on majority policy items, leadership 
should be deferred to the executive. The second is to try to offer a pragmatic approach to 
when a caucus/conference is to the extreme of the overall general public. The third is to 
show grit and no mercy on your fellow membership. Leadership style is relevant; 
however, it is not the final determination whether a policy moves forward or not.  These 
styles are created by the times these individual Leaders find themselves, and not 
themselves. Therefore styles are fluid and therefore it is not easy to measure in terms of 
outcomes. The Leader him/herself is more relevant as part of the policymaking process 




 As stated previously, styles are not particularly the most important aspect of the 
policymaking process. However, in the modern era of gridlock, one style may be the 
most effective. Senator Harry Reid’s (D-NV) grit style as the enforcer would be 
beneficial for any Leader moving forward. This promotes discipline in a time where 
individuals have the most power. While it may not work all of the time, maintaining 
majority party discipline is essential in hoping to overcome some filibusters and passing 
legislation. Again though, this type of style only would work best because the rules of the 
institution and the current timeframe demand it. 
Further Research 
 This paper squarely focuses on the dynamic between the institution of the Senate 
and its impact on the behavior of the individual actors. It is, generally, a paper that 
focuses on the internal issues within the Senate. This is only half the story. It is 
recommended that further research should be conducted on the Senate’s impact on the 
policymaking process. One recommendation is to study the impact that external factors 
have on the Senate’s role in this legislative process. Namely, what is the role that outside 
interest groups? What about the role of the House, is it relevant? Also, the role of the 
President and the judiciary on the Senate’s motivation to pass legislation is extremely 
important. External factors should also include elections and the role of special interests 
such as lobbyists. By examining both internal and external factors, one will have full 
understanding of how the Senate operates and its proper role in the legislative process. 
 This paper sought to study the internal dynamics within a complex legislative 
body, therefore it is limited. Without studying other facets of the policymaking process 
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(and yes, different definitions of this process) the paper may not have the final answer for 
Senate reform. Taken in the context of this study, however, this paper intends to be a 
solid foundation for additional research. Both external facets described above, other 
internal facets of the Senate, and different definitions of the policymaking process will 
give a more complete picture of how the Senate functions as a legislative body. 
Conclusion 
 The Senate is a complex legislative institution. For much of its history the Senate 
was a place where representatives of the states discussed sectional issues that eventually 
split the country into two. The body has for far too long held to this norm that it 
represents states and not people, as it was once originally to do. This is not the case 
anymore for has not been the case for nearly 100 years. The body never made the 
appropriate changes after direct elections were implemented, namely that now as a full 
fledge democratic body; perhaps it should have rules that are consistent with this 
principle. Abolishing the filibuster will make the Senate more democratic. The Senate 
must change this archaic rule for both the sake of the legitimacy of the institution and for 
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